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Disguised Patent Policymaking
Saurabh Vishnubhakat*
Abstract
Patent Office power has grown immensely in this decade, and
the agency is wielding its power in predictably troubling ways.
Like other agencies, it injects politics into its decisions while
relying on technocratic justifications. It also reads grants of
authority expansively to aggrandize its power, especially to the
detriment of judicial checks on agency action. However, this story
of Patent Office ascendancy differs from that of other agencies in
two important respects. One is that the U.S. patent system still
remains primarily a means for allocating property rights, not a
comprehensive regime of industrial regulation. Thus, the Patent
Office cannot yet claim broad autonomy to make substantive
political judgments. Indeed, the agency until now has wielded its
power mostly in disguise. The other difference is that the era of
broad Patent Office power is still in relative infancy. Recent years
have seen important analytical and empirical studies of the
agency’s dramatic changes, but its new and controversial practices
are not yet entrenched. Meaningful reform is still possible, and it
is desirable. Patent Office power has grown so much so quickly in
part because the political valence of that power has been obscured
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by a blinkered focus on technological expertise. Understanding the
agency’s pernicious structural choices—such as commingling
separately delegated powers in order to evade judicial review and
stacking adjudicatory panels to reach desired outcomes—in terms
of politicization reveals significant risks of injury upon the
agency’s ability to make credible commitments, and also
illuminates potential solutions.
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I. Introduction
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or
USPTO) has begun to make policy in disguise, with enough
success that the pretense may not be needed much longer. The
power of the agency has reached a high-water mark, and
although some of the most important and troubling effects of this
administrative ascendancy were unintended, they were not
unforeseeable. For more than a third of a century, institutional
primacy in the patent system lay in the courts, especially the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.1 Over the same period,
however, Congress diminished this judicial primacy three times
in favor of growing agency power, most recently in the 2011
America Invents Act (AIA).2 The relatively benign nature of the
first two diminishments,3 together with an incomplete
understanding of how they relate to the third, explain much
about why the agency’s power has now started to grow
unchecked.
Prior reallocations of power away from the judiciary and to
the agency rested on broad legislative consensus. Even in the
AIA, the creation of robust agency proceedings by which
administrative judges in the USPTO Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB) could revoke previously issued patents rights was
a deliberative, if dramatic, choice by Congress. However, the most
recent and aggressive expansions of Patent Office power have
come from inside the agency itself. Upon receiving specific grants
of discretion from Congress, the Patent Office has advanced
expansive interpretations of those grants, reflecting ever broader
claims of its own power.4 At their most extraordinary, these
1. See Melissa F. Wasserman, The Changing Guard of Patent Law:
Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1959, 1962–63 (2013)
(noting that the Federal Circuit is perceived to be “the most important expositor
of the substantive law of patents in the United States”).
2. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284
(2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
3. See 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2018) (limiting scope of ex parte review); id.
§ 311(b) (limiting scope of inter partes review).
4. See, for example, infra Part II.B, discussing how the PTAB has sought
to insulate itself from judicial review after the AIA made the PTAB’s
discretionary decision whether to review a case “final and nonappealable,” 35
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claims include the power to stack panels of administrative judges
to reach desired outcomes in individual cases.5 The agency has
stacked panels in a number of cases and even multiple times
within individual cases.6 The agency also claims the power to
make far-reaching decisions about vested patent rights with
absolute immunity from judicial review.7 The pattern of
aggrandizement in the agency’s positions, especially before its
supervisors in the Federal Circuit, is unmistakable.
What has been less clear, until now, is why Congressional
action in this power transfer has been so one-sided. Historically,
the justifications for enlarging Patent Office power and for
creating and endowing the Federal Circuit’s own considerable
power were the same: expertise.8 The Federal Circuit was created
in 1982 out of a desire for nationally uniform appellate oversight
in patent litigation, which had previously been fragmented across
regional circuits.9 Uniformity would come from a single court
U.S.C. § 314(d) (nonappealability of inter partes review); id. § 324(e)
(nonappealability of post-grant review).
5. See infra Part II.A (discussing the PTAB’s recent practice of
reconfiguring administrative judge panels with different or additional agency
judges to produce outcomes it seeks).
6. For example, in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., No.
IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014), the original PTAB panel consisted of
three judges but by the end, four judges had been added and all seven judges
voted on Target Corporation’s Motion for Joinder. See Decision Granting Motion
for Joinder, Target, No. IPR2014-00508, Paper 31 (granting joinder by a vote of
4–3).
7. See infra Part II.B–II.D (describing the PTAB’s attempts to argue that
its case selection, statutory time bar, and adjudication decisions are
unreviewable).
8. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan, Strategic
Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 45, 51–55 [hereinafter Strategic Decision Making] (identifying
expertise, cost, and accuracy as primary reasons why Congress created a system
where patent examinations are reviewed within the Patent Office); 28 U.S.C.
§ 44 note (2018) (Congressional Statement Regarding Appointment of Judges)
(“The Congress . . . suggests that the President, in nominating individuals to
judgeships on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit . . . select from a broad range of qualified individuals.”).
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20–23 (1981) (“The new Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit will provide nationwide uniformity in patent law, will
make the rules applied in patent litigation more predictable and will eliminate
the expensive, time-consuming and unseemly forum-shopping that characterizes
litigation in the field.”). The Federal Circuit was created by the Federal Courts
Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended
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with exclusive appellate jurisdiction, populated by judges who
were experts in patent doctrine.10 Since then, a number of
Federal Circuit judges have also brought substantive expertise in
science and technology.11
Meanwhile, the first grant to the Patent Office of power
broadly to reevaluate already-issued patents came in 1981 with
the creation of ex parte reexamination.12 Power over patent
validity previously belonged primarily to Article III courts, but
the relatively greater expertise of the Patent Office promised
faster, cheaper, and more accurate decisions than those of
generalist district judges and juries.13 Even more than the
Federal Circuit, the agency had clear expertise in the science and
technology of the inventions being patented as well as in the
doctrinal details of patent law.14

in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
10. See Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L.
REV. 763, 772 (2008) (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that the
Federal Circuit has useful expertise in patent law, and that the Supreme Court
benefits from having its views.”). However, judges appointed to the Federal
Circuit have not always had patent or trademark law expertise. See Report
Concerning the Nomination of Judges to the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 70 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 599, 603 [hereinafter Report
Concerning Nominations] (lamenting the nominations to the Federal Circuit
from its creation in 1982 to 1988 because “only one out of the seven nominees
submitted to Congress in that period, Judge Newman, had patent expertise”).
11. See, e.g., Report Concerning Nominations, supra note 10, at 602 n.9
(describing how Chief Judge Markey’s background as a patent lawyer helped the
Federal Circuit address and resolve circuit splits on various patent law issues);
id. at 603 n.11 (noting that Judge Nies was a trademark lawyer prior to his
appointment to the bench but had had two years of patent experience as a judge
on the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals).
12. See Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 301–307 (2018)) (allowing parties to request
reexamination of patent claims based on prior art).
13. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing how reduced costs,
expertise, and accuracy associated with Patent Office review influenced
Congress in broadening the Patent Office’s review powers).
14. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2018) (requiring that “administrative patent
judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”),
with 28 U.S.C. § 44 note (Congressional Statement Regarding Appointment of
Judges) (expressing the sense of the Congress merely that “qualified
individuals” should be appointed to the Federal Circuit).
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Subsequent enlargements of Patent Office power relied on
the same claim of expertise, especially scientific expertise. The
system of inter partes reexamination created in the 1999
American Inventors Protection Act15 and the suite of trial-like
administrative adjudications created in the 2011 America Invents
Act all held up the agency’s expertise as a reason to empower it
further. Indeed, the AIA in particular was explicitly
substitutionary in ways that the preceding reexamination
systems were not.16 The Patent Office did not only receive
broader power, but now received that power at the expense of the
courts. In many contexts, parties could choose one forum or the
other, but either choice now foreclosed the other.17 Patent power
became more of a zero-sum game, and expertise was the stated
justification.
The blinkered focus on expertise, however, has obscured until
now, another important principle that animates the Patent
Office’s claims to expansive power and does much to explain the
agency’s behavior, even its initial success. That principle is the
direct injection of politics and policy preferences into patent law.
The Patent Office has suffered from a well-known history of being
denied autonomy in matters of substantive patent law and policy.
This history, which includes a lack of Chevron deference18 on
legal matters and intrusive judicial review even on factual
matters, set the agency apart from most of the modern
administrative state.19 Meanwhile, the transformations that the
AIA brought about were a sea change in the systemic role of the
15. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4604, 113 Stat. 1501A-552, 567–70 (codified
as amended in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319) (allowing for inter partes review of patent
claims and setting forth procedures for such review).
16. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 325(d) (allowing the Director of the Patent Office
to prioritize a post-grant review while, among other things, staying or
terminating other pending proceedings regarding the same patent).
17. See id. § 325(a) (barring post-grant review by the Patent Office if the
requesting party has already filed a civil action in the courts).
18. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842–44 (1984) (discussing the deference given by courts to “permissible
constructions” by agencies of ambiguous statutes governing their actions).
19. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1973 (noting that Chevron deference is
warranted when an agency has “authority to engage in formal adjudication or
rule making,” but “[u]nlike most notable agencies, the PTO lacks significant
substantive rule-making authority”).
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Patent Office. Legislative and academic opinion were focused on
agency expertise,20 with no corresponding political account of
agency power to impose principled limits, creating the
opportunity for a clean break from past practice.
The effects of this break are profound. The Patent Office
stands to make considerable institutional gains from its
aggrandizements. Foremost among these gains is the freedom to
engage in structural and, eventually, substantive policymaking
with little or no judicial competition from district courts or
supervision from the Federal Circuit.21 Indeed, the initial balance
in this power struggle is mixed but presently tips in the agency’s
favor. At the same time, recent Patent Office practices inflict
significant injury to stable property rights in the patent system,
to the ability of Congress and of the agency itself to make credible
commitments to innovators and consumers, and to the future of
judicial safeguards in the patent system.22 If realized, the gains
may be short-lived or not, but the injuries are likely to be
long-lasting.
To be sure, one may reasonably ask what is so fundamentally
troubling about an administrative agency exercising political
20. For illustrative legislative discussion, see, for example, 157 CONG. REC.
2,843 (2011) (statement of Sen. Klobuchar) (praising the AIA’s provisions
allowing any third party to provide patent examiners with potentially relevant
information because they could enhance the agency’s expertise); Crossing the
Finish Line on Patent Reform: What Can and Should Be Done: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop., Competition, and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (statement of David Simon,
Associate General Counsel, Intel Corporation) (arguing that no limitations
should be placed on the inter partes and ex parte review systems because
limitations “will encourage immediate lawsuits on bad patents to avoid the
expertise of the Office invalidating these patents”). For illustrative academic
discussion, see Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1985 (lamenting that the D.C.
Circuit has deferred to the expertise of the Patent Office instead of seizing on
ambiguity to review agency proceedings); Ryan Whalen, Complex Innovation
and the Patent Office, 17 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 226, 262–64 (2017)
(suggesting reforms to improve Patent Office efficiency, like opening up inter
partes review by providing incentives that maximize the expertise of patent
examiners).
21. See infra Part II.B (discussing how the Patent Office’s decision to
institute review of patents is final and nonappealable).
22. See infra Part III.B (discussing the systemic harms caused by
aggrandized agency power).
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power and making policy in its own domain. Even the tendency of
agencies to aggrandize their power is well-theorized and easy to
identify precisely because this tendency is widespread. Why is
Patent Office power different?
For one thing, it is unlike decades-old regimes such as
securities regulation or telecommunications that, at times, also
present concerns of unchecked agency power. The revocation of
patent rights through administrative trial proceedings under the
AIA is only a few years old.23 The system’s current scale was
much larger than predicted, its eventual scale still unknown, and
its eventual reach still untested. For scholars and institutional
designers who have been present at the creation, therefore, the
best time to curb Patent Office aggrandizement is now, after
detailed empirical information about the system and its effects
has become available24—but before its more dubious precedents
become too strongly entrenched to reverse.
The other, more fundamental difference is that the Patent
Office’s disempowered past is also its present. Though the agency
may wish to move away from its past subordination to the
Federal Circuit, Congress has made no such move. Patent law
historically denied the Patent Office substantive rulemaking
authority and the judicial deference that comes with it.25
Congress considered proposals to change this in the AIA, but
rejected them.26 Congress could have committed more of the
23. The AIA was enacted on September 16, 2011 but it took effect one year
later. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 35, 125 Stat. 284,
341 (2011).
24. See generally Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An
Early Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014) (reporting an
empirical study tracking the outcome of IPR proceedings two years after the
effective date of the AIA); Matthew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter
Partes Review and Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 469 (2015)
(discussing empirical data showing the effects of IPR on parallel federal court
litigation); Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8 (presenting an empirical and
analytical study of how litigants use IPR relative to parallel federal court
litigation).
25. See Wasserman, supra note 1, at 1973 (“The PTO, however, has not
historically possessed the authority to engage in formal adjudication or rule
making—the two formal procedures that Mead indicates would likely warrant
deference.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–31 (2001)).
26. See 153 CONG. REC. H10,281 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of
CONNECT) (“The existing rulemaking language in the bill is too expansive and
gives the [Patent Office] unparalleled authority . . . . As such, we urge you to
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administrative trial process to the agency’s discretion, but did not
do so. What politically inflected powers the Patent Office did
receive were specific and more limited than how it actually
exercises those powers. For the agency now to try and squeeze
elephants into these mouseholes is inappropriate.
Given these likely systemic injuries and the unpersuasive
counter-arguments that support the Patent Office’s conduct, a
political explanation and evaluation of agency power that goes
beyond expertise alone is necessary. This Article provides that
explanation and evaluation, offering the first detailed critique of
recent Patent Office aggrandizements to make policy in disguise.
Part 0 details the offending practices. First, it traces the
agency’s startling admissions about stacking administrative
panels, inconsistent and shifting justifications for it, and the
ways in which panel stacking has worked. Then it turns to the
agency’s attempts to evade judicial review, first by colorably
interpreting ambiguous nonappealability statutes and then by
relying on early victories to stake out more implausible terrain.
Part III evaluates the effects of these practices, identifying
particular agency benefits as well as systemic harms. It also
explores alternatives to judicial review for policing Patent Office
excesses and concludes that these alternatives are ultimately
inadequate.
Building on these descriptive and normative premises, Part
IV then explains how the Patent Office was able to engage in
these successful and attempted expansions of its own power. It
begins with the traditional account of expertise as the reason why
power over patent validity should be reallocated from courts to
the agency, finding this account incomplete. It continues with a
discussion of politics and policy preferences as an increasingly
salient explanation for Patent Office power, including even
legislative indications that these values should, within limits,
play a role in patent law. It turns next to a discussion of the
follow the Senate’s lead and remove the PTO rulemaking provision from the
House bill.”); id. at H23,958 (statement of Rep. Issa) (“But this amendment on
rulemaking which would stop an arbitrary decision by the Patent Office on
something it may want to do . . . is there for a reason. . . . [I]t is crucial for this
amendment to get into it if we are going to protect against arbitrary action by
the Patent and Trademark Office.”).

1676

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019)

agency’s especially pernicious choice to commingle the separate
powers of screening and adjudication, which Congress delegated
separately in the AIA, in a single administrative decision-making
body. It concludes with focal points for reforming the current
system of disguised patent policymaking so that the validity of
patent rights is adjudicated more coherently, and the Patent
Office exercises its power in a more principled and accountable
way.
II. Agency Aggrandizement in Patent Law
This Part discusses the two principal ways in which the
Patent Office has exercised questionable power in its adjudicatory
processes. Both have inappropriately displaced judicial authority,
that of the U.S. district courts as well as the Federal Circuit, and
both are best understood as political claims to power in the guise
of technocratic administration. Part II.A discusses panel
stacking, the practice of changing the makeup of certain Patent
Office panels of administrative judges to reach desired outcomes.
Parts II.B–D discuss a progression of related efforts by the Patent
Office to insulate itself from judicial review in the Federal Circuit
and from competition with the U.S. district courts for patent
validity cases.
A. Stacking Administrative Judge Panels
The systematic push to enlarge Patent Office power in
administrative adjudication, free from judicial interference, is a
phenomenon in progress.27 The first and most troubling symptom
of this enlargement is a pattern of opaquely political Patent
Office decision-making. In cases where USPTO leadership has
been dissatisfied with an administrative panel’s initial decision,
the agency’s practice has been to reconfigure the panel with
additional agency judges and rehear the case to produce a more
27. See Greg Reilly, Bridging the Gap Between the Federal Courts and the
Patent & Trademark Office: The Journal of Science and Technology Law
Symposium: The Constitutionality of Administrative Patent Litigation, 23 B.U.
J. SCI. & TECH. 377, 379 (discussing the expansion of the Patent Office’s power
after Congress passed the America Invents Act).
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desirable outcome. Though the impropriety of changing an
adjudicatory tribunal’s composition for result-oriented reasons is
intuitive, the particular benefits that the agency seems to see for
itself through this approach are less obvious,28 and the particular
systemic harms that result are bound up with the structural
details of the agency’s patent validity review system.29
The Patent Trial and Appeal Board is the Patent Office unit
that hears administrative challenges to patent validity, whether
inter partes review (IPR), covered business method review, or
post-grant review.30 These three types of proceedings were
established by the AIA to provide a more vigorous reevaluation of
the validity of patents that the agency has already issued.31 Due
to a number of institutional and structural factors, the initial
review that patent applications receive from agency examiners
tends, in close cases, to err on the side more of granting
undeserving patents than of denying deserving ones.32
28. See infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the agency’s attempts to argue that
its authority to stack panels to achieve coherent policy earns it Chevron
deference).
29. See infra Part III.B (discussing the harms caused by the Patent Office’s
aggrandizement of power, including the destabilization of patent property
rights).
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(c), 326(c) (2018).
31. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 51 (“The importance of
error correction remains a dominant theme in ex post patent review . . . .”).
32. This is the subject of a wide-ranging analytical and empirical
literature. For representative discussions of the analytical issues, see generally
Sean B. Seymore, The Presumption of Patentability, 97 MINN. L. REV. 990 (2013)
(examining the presumption of patentability employed by patent examiners);
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470 (2011) (discussing the
incentives that the Patent Office has in granting patents because grants cannot
be appealed by any party other than the patent applicant); Melissa F.
Wasserman, The PTO’s Asymmetric Incentives: Pressure to Expand Substantive
Patent Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 379 (2011) (arguing that the Federal Circuit is
pressured to announce broad legal standards when the Patent Office itself
expands patentability standards); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the
Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001) (arguing that patent examiners do
not thoroughly vet patents in part because of a strain on resource). For
representative empirical discussions, see generally Michael D. Frakes & Melissa
F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Grant Too Many
Bad Patents?: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 613 (2015)
(presenting empirical findings that the Patent Office is biased toward granting
patents); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does Agency Funding
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Meanwhile, correcting patent errors through the federal courts is
perceived to be unduly costly, protracted, prone to error, and hard
to access due to Article III standing and the declaratory judgment
cause of action, among other constraints.33 The AIA review
proceedings allow these issues to be resolved in adversarial
litigation before administrative patent judges who must be
“persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”34—
i.e., who must understand both the technological details of
patented inventions and the doctrinal details of patent law.
In hearing cases challenging patent validity, the PTAB must
sit in panels of “at least 3 members.”35 The Director and Deputy
Director of the Patent Office as well as the Commissioners for
Patents and Trademarks are, by statute, members of the PTAB in
addition to the administrative patent judges themselves.36 The
power to grant rehearing rests exclusively in the PTAB, and the
power to designate members of a PTAB panel belongs to the
Director.37
Thus, expanding a panel for a rehearing seems, on first
impression, to be within the power of the Director, who is a
member of the PTAB and is empowered to designate members of
a PTAB panel. Yet a series of cases has revealed both the
questionable way in which the Patent Office actually exercises
these powers and the agency’s shifting justifications for its
practice. The agency first confirmed its result-oriented panel
stacking during a December 2015 oral argument in the Yissum38
case:

Affect Decisionmaking?: An Empirical Assessment of the PTO’s Granting
Patterns, 66 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2013) (presenting empirical findings that suggest
the Patent Office’s fee structure creates financial incentives for granting
patents).
33. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 50–64 (summarizing
the evolving preference in U.S. patent law for administrative, rather than
judicial, error-correction).
34. 35 U.S.C. § 6(a).
35. Id. § 6(c) (emphasis added).
36. Id. § 6(a).
37. Id. § 6(c).
38. Yissum Research Dev. Co. of The Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Sony
Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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And, anytime there has been a
seeming other outlier, you’ve
engaged the power to reconfigure
the panel so as to get the result
you want?
Yes, your Honor.
And, you don’t see a problem with
that?
Your Honor, the Director is trying
to ensure that her policy position
is being enforced by the panels.39

The motivation to implement policy preferences through
adjudication rather than through rulemaking is not itself
problematic, especially as the Patent Office lacks substantive
rulemaking authority.40 To the extent that Congress has
empowered the agency to “speak with the force of law”41 through
formal adjudicatory authority, incremental policymaking through
adjudication may be not only permissible, but preferable. The
propriety of doing so by changing a panel’s composition, however,
is not as clear, as Judge Taranto’s subsequent questions in
Yissum suggest:
Judge Taranto:

The Director is not given
adjudicatory authority, right,
under § 6 of the statute? That
gives it to the Board.

39. Oral Argument at 47:20, Yissum, 626 F. App’x 1006 (Nos.
2015-1342, -1343), https://perma.cc/H3SL-BX5Q (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
40. See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549–50 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(explaining that 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) “does NOT grant the Commissioner the
authority to issue substantive rules”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982)
(quoting Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)). See generally
Wasserman, supra note 1, for an excellent overview of the Patent Office’s
historical inability to speak with the force of law and the changes that the AIA
made in that regard by creating adjudications arguably formal enough to merit
judicial deference.
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Patent Office:

Judge Taranto:

Patent Office:

Judge Taranto:

Patent Office:

Right. To clarify, the Director is a
member of the Board, but your
Honor is correct—
But after the panel is chosen, I’m
not sure I see the authority there
to
engage
in
case-specific
re-adjudication from the Director
after the panel has been selected.
That’s correct, once the panel has
been set, it has the adjudicatory
authority and the—
Until, in your view, it’s reset by
adding a few members who will
come out the other way?
That’s correct, your Honor. We
believe that’s what Alappat
holds.42

The agency’s reliance on the 1994 In re Alappat43 decision is
notable, as the Patent Office in that case survived a challenge to
a similar practice of expanding a panel of the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).44 The BPAI was the
predecessor of the PTAB and differed in important ways, making
Alappat distinguishable from the present context. The more basic
weakness of relying on Alappat, however, is that the Federal
Circuit did not actually address the due process challenge in that
case, but merely dismissed it as waived.45 That the due process
concerns associated with panel stacking remain a live issue and
raise serious questions about the rule of law became clear during
another oral argument, this time in the Wi-Fi One46 case:
42. Oral Argument in Yissum, supra note 39, at 47:41.
43. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
44. See id. at 1531–36 (holding that the former 35 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) granted
the Commissioner of the BPAI the authority to designate the members of a
panel and expand a panel).
45. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1536 (determining that Alappat had
waived his due process argument against re-designation of the panel because he
acquiesced to the BPAI Commissioner’s actions).
46. Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
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Judge Wallach:
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The situation I described to your
esteemed colleague where, in
effect, the Director puts his or her
thumb
on
the
outcome—
shenanigan or not? It’s within the
written procedures.
So, your hypothetical is the
Director stacks the Board?
Yeah, more than a hypothetical.
It happens all the time. It’s a
request for reconsideration with a
larger panel.
That’s within the Director’s
authority. The makeup of the
Board to review the petition is
within the Director’s authority.
Whether that rises to the level of
shenanigans or not—
Aren’t there fundamental rule of
law questions there, basic things
like predictability and uniformity
and transparency of judgments
and
neutrality
of
decision
makers? And don’t we review that
kind of thing?47

Indeed, these rule of law concerns are of a piece with Federal
Circuit unease about other peculiarities in the PTAB’s practices,
such as selecting certain meritorious portions of petitions for
review, denying other portions as being “redundant,” and
claiming absolute immunity from judicial review or even from
explaining the contours of a “doctrine of redundancy.”48 Writing
47. Oral Argument at 26:37, Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d 1364 (Nos.
2015-1944, -1945, -1946), https://perma.cc/KH7G-Y756 (last visited Sept. 2,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
48. See generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Non-Doctrine of
Redundancy, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 777 (2019) (discussing the Patent Office
practice of denying requests for review because it believes they are redundant
and highlighting problems with this practice).
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separately in Shaw Industries Group, Inc. v. Automated Creel,
Systems, Inc.,49 for example, Judge Reyna concluded in that
context that the claim of the Patent Office “to unchecked
discretionary authority is unprecedented.”50
The Patent Office then replied more cautiously when pressed
about panel stacking during the June 2017 oral argument in the
Nidec Motor Corp. v. Zhongshan Broad Ocean Motor Co.51 case:
Judge Reyna:

What kind of uniformity or certainty
do we have in that where the PTAB
can look at a prior decision and say,
“Well we don’t like that, let’s jump
back in there and change that?”
Patent Office: Well—
Judge Wallach: How does the Director choose which
judge to assign to expand the panel?
Patent Office: That’s provided, your Honor, by our
standard operating procedure. And,
the Chief Judge actually makes that
decision. And, the judges are selected
based on their technical and legal
competency. And, over the years,
many, many panels at the Board
have been expanded. In fact if you
looked at the thirty—
Judge Reyna: Are they selected on whether they’re
going to rule in a certain way?
Patent Office: Well, people can be placed on the
panel—for example, the Director can
place him- or herself on the panel,
and certainly the Director knows how
they’re going to rule. Nidec has not
said—and they say at their blue brief
at page 43 that they don’t challenge
the independence of these judges on
49. 817 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2016), abrogated by Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d 1364
(Fed. Cir. 2018).
50. Shaw Industries Group, 817 F.3d at 1303 (Reyna, J., concurring).
51. 868 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
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this panel. These judges were not
selected and told to make a
particular decision. If judges could be
told to make a particular decision,
there would be no need to expand a
panel in the first place.52
The agency’s assurance of decisional independence for its
administrative judges is, indeed, quite important and would do
much to reduce concerns about “predictability and uniformity and
transparency of judgments and neutrality of decision makers.”53
However, this account rings hollow in light of the repeated
panel stacking in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.54 In
that case, the original panel consisted, as usual, of three judges.55
As the decision drew near, the PTAB on its own initiative
expanded the panel to five judges to avoid an anticipated
unsatisfactory outcome by the three-judge panel.56 The PTAB’s
standard operating procedure for panel stacking provides for
exactly this sort of sua sponte expansion.57 The panel need not
await a request for rehearing: the choice to expand may come
before a decision by the current panel.58
52. Oral Argument at 25:27, Nidec, 868 F.3d 1013 (No. 2016-2321),
https://perma.cc/4Y89-S4RJ (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
53. Oral Argument in Wi-fi One, supra note 47, at 26:37.
54. No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014).
55. See Order on Conduct of the Proceeding, Target, No. IPR2014-00508,
Paper 4 (recounting a conference call regarding the briefing schedule between
counsel for the parties and the three administrative patent judges assigned to
the case).
56. See Decision Denying Motion for Joinder, Target, No. IPR2014-00508,
Paper 18 (denying petitioner Target Corporation’s motion for joinder by a vote of
3–2).
57. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 1 (REVISION 15) 1–2 (2018),
https://perma.cc/74CA-C48R (PDF) (“This [Standard Operating Procedure] does
not limit the authority of the Director to designate, de-designate, or otherwise
alter in any way at any time, panels . . . .” (emphasis added)).
58. See id. at 16 (“When an expanded panel is designated (1) after a case
initially has been assigned to a panel and (2) before a decision is entered by the
panel, the judges initially designated shall be designated, if available, as part of
the expanded panel.”).
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But in Target, the plan failed at first. Even the expanded
five-judge panel reached what the agency leadership considered
the wrong outcome.59 The only way this could have happened, of
course, was that all three judges originally on the panel had been
planning to rule this way in light of the evidence and argument.
Indeed, this is just what happened. The PTAB added two judges
to the panel, apparently hoping to sway one of the original three
and thus produce a 3–2 decision going the other way. None of the
three were swayed, however, and the result was a 3–2 decision
that frustrated the agency’s first, preemptive attempt at panel
stacking.60
Granting rehearing over the objection of the three original
judges,61 the PTAB added yet another two judges to the panel, for
a total of seven, so that a 4–3 decision that was satisfactory to the
agency leadership could be assured.62 Even then, the three judges
on the original panel, finally outnumbered, still issued a dissent
adhering to their original position63 just as they had dissented
from the re-stacked panel’s order granting rehearing at all.64
The sum of these illustrations of Patent Office panel stacking
is that the ostensibly neutral and independent adjudicatory
process that the AIA put in place has been overlaid with a system
of adjustments and distortions that are much more
outcome-driven in nature and much more beholden to the
agency’s political hierarchy than a narrative of impartial
technocracy might suggest. What the Patent Office might stand
to gain from panel stacking—notably, but not exclusively,
Chevron deference—is discussed below,65 as are the systemic
59. Decision Denying Joinder, supra note 56.
60. Id.
61. See Decision Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, Target, No.
IPR2014-00508, Paper 28 (granting rehearing—with the original three judges
dissenting).
62. Decision Granting Joinder, supra note 56.
63. See id. at 7 (dissenting opinion) (arguing briefly that 35 U.S.C. § 315(c)
(2018) does not authorize joinder of proceedings and citing their dissenting
opinion in Paper 28).
64. See Decision Granting Rehearing, supra note 61, at 1 (dissenting
opinion) (arguing that the majority essentially “convert[ed] a statutory bar to
inter partes review into a discretionary bar” not subject to review).
65. See infra Part III.A (discussing how the PTAB has sought Chevron
deference by arguing that its panel stacking authority is evidence that it has the
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costs that the practice might impose66 and the analytical reasons
why the agency might plausibly think itself authorized to decide
cases this way at all.67 The more immediate lesson is that the
details of panel stacking reveal an admitted pattern of Patent
Office policymaking in the guise of adjudication, and a desire to
implement political judgments using a process built on the
rhetoric of the agency’s technical expertise.
B. Resisting Review of Case Selection
Panel stacking reflects an enlargement of Patent Office
power that has unfolded primarily inside the agency (though
later implications like Chevron deference do look outward to the
judiciary). At the same time, the Patent Office has also directly
aggrandized itself in the courts, on the issue of judicial review
itself, through a series of procedural choices that push beyond the
text and structure of the AIA. The Supreme Court approved one
of these choices in 2016, as this Part discusses.68 The en banc
Federal Circuit disapproved a second in early 2018, as Part II.C
explains next.69 The third and most recent just failed in the
Supreme Court, creating considerable disruption in PTAB
administration, as Part II.D addresses.70 These attempted
aggrandizements mark a significant shift away from the courtagency allocation of power that Congress put in place through the
AIA.
power to speak consistently).
66. See infra Part III.B (arguing that panel stacking hurts due process,
undermines stability of patent property rights, and prevents meaningful judicial
oversight).
67. See infra Part IV (discussing how the PTAB interpreted congressional
delegations of power overbroadly).
68. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2136 (2016)
(concluding that 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) bars judicial review of the PTAB’s decision to
institute IPR).
69. See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(concluding that time-bar determinations under 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) are
appealable).
70. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018) (holding that partial
institution of inter partes review (e.g., reviewing some claims while not
reviewing others) is outside the PTAB’s authority).
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The first of the Patent Office’s efforts at insulating itself from
judicial scrutiny of PTAB review was in the context of evaluating
PTAB petitions for merit and deciding whether even to proceed
with review. This was a natural starting point because the AIA
itself gives the Patent Office some discretion to screen cases and,
importantly, makes those discretionary determinations “final and
nonappealable.”71 The eventual dispute on this issue would turn
on the scope and extent of this discretion and of the insulation of
screening-related decisions from judicial review.
In the early days of AIA reviews, particularly inter partes
review, the PTAB quickly received a reputation for allowing a
large majority of petitions to proceed through the screening phase
and into merits adjudication.72 Among petitions for inter partes
review, the PTAB granted review as to at least one challenged
claim in the patent for eighty-four percent of petitions.73 Among
those petitions that the PTAB selected, the eventual rate of
patent cancellation was also quite high: one early estimate found
that in seventy-seven percent of cases that reached a final
decision on the merits, all of the disputed claims in the patent
were invalidated.74
71. 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (nonappealability of inter partes review); id. § 324(e)
(nonappealability of post-grant review).
72. See, e.g., R. David Donoghue, 3 Benefits of Parallel District Court
Litigation
and
IPR,
LAW360
(June
9,
2014,
10:21
AM),
https://perma.cc/2KEX-VL8Q (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (noting that, as of
early 2014, approximately eighty-four percent of inter partes review petitions
were instituted) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Tony Dutra,
Rader Regrets CLS Bank Impasse, Comments on Latest Patent Reform Bill, BNA
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY (Oct. 29, 2013), https://perma.cc/4H96QWFR (last visited Sept. 22, 2019) (recounting the opinion of former Federal
Circuit Chief Judge Rader that PTAB judges are “acting as death squads, killing
property rights”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Claims
Can Survive Inter Partes and Covered Business Method Review (But Few Do),
HUNTON ANDREWS KURTH LLP (Apr. 7, 2014), https://perma.cc/W78C-32KV (last
visited Sept. 3, 2019) (arguing that the PTAB is “where patent claims go to die”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Gregory Dolin, Dubious
Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 926–27 (2015) (arguing that the PTAB
makes it “too easy to invalidate a duly issued patent”).
73. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 78 (citing a study by
Love & Ambwani, supra note 24, at 100).
74. See Love & Ambwani, supra note 24, at 94 (“Among IPRs that reach a
final decision on the merits, all instituted claims are invalidated or disclaimed
more than 77 percent of the time . . . .”).
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The latter finding was to be expected. The PTAB’s legal
criterion for selecting cases is a sufficient likelihood that at least
one of the challenged claims of the patent will successfully be
invalidated.75 Thus, it stands to reason that cases actually
selected for review will tend to reflect outcomes in that direction.
The former finding, however—a high rate of acceptance
through the screening process itself—was less self-evident. One
possibility was that the set of patents that petitioners would
initially be expected to challenge in the PTAB were subject to
selection effects.76 For example, this is true of disputes that
parties litigate in court rather than resolve by settlement.77 On
this view, the early cohort of patents that petitioners chose to
challenge, especially in inter partes review, were low-hanging
fruit and unusually vulnerable to invalidation.78
Another important source of the PTAB’s observed leniency in
screening petitions, however, was its lax interpretation of the
requirement that a petition must identify each of its challenges
with “particularity.”79 Controversy arose over this interpretation
75. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 324(a) (2018) (requiring the Director to
determine that “there is a reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would
prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition” before
instituting review).
76. See Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking Patents, 73 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 719, 756 (2016) (hypothesizing that because patents tested in the PTAB
“crucible” are weaker and more likely to be invalidated, “the high percentage of
invalidation at the PTAB indicates nothing other than selection bias”).
77. See generally George Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of
Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (theorizing that the
determinants of whether to litigate are solely economic, and demonstrating that,
all economic conditions being equal, plaintiffs can expect about a fifty percent
rate of success).
78. See Jarrad Wood & Jonathan R. K. Stroud, Three Hundred Nos: An
Empirical Analysis of the First 300+ Denials of Institution for Inter Partes and
Covered Business Method Patent Reviews Prior to In re Cuozzo Speed
Technologies, LLC, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 112, 141–42 (2015)
(citing Rob Sterne & Gene Quinn, PTAB Death Squads: Are All Commercially
Viable
Patents
Invalid?,
IPWATCHDOG
(Mar.
24,
2014),
https://perma.cc/QB2J-3SQN (last visited Sept. 3, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review)) (“As some practitioners conjecture, perhaps
the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of particularly problematic patents may grow scarce in
years to come, further depressing these percentages.”).
79. See 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3) (requiring that a petition must identify, “in
writing and with particularity, each claim challenged, the grounds on which the
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because the Patent Office did not merely claim the power to
screen and select cases without judicial interference at the time of
screening. Rather, the agency argued that its screening was not
subject to judicial supervision at any time, even after a final
agency action.80 Two competing views arose about the propriety of
this interpretation.
One view was that the nonappealability of the decision
whether to institute review meant merely that a litigant,
particularly an aggrieved patent owner who was being drawn into
a review proceeding, could not obtain an interlocutory appeal of
the agency’s decision to proceed.81 In other words, a patent
owner’s right not to be subjected to an unmeritorious patent
validity challenge was not protected by the courts. Indeed, if such
a “right not to stand trial” existed, then by definition it would
have to be redressed up front through interlocutory review or not
at all.
However, review would remain available later of all issues,
on the basic administrative law principle that intermediate issues
merge into an agency’s final order on the merits.82 This would
include review of screening-related decisions that may have
overlapped analytically with the adjudication of merits or that
may have implicated statutory limits on the agency’s authority.83
challenge to each claim is based, and the evidence that supports the grounds for
the challenge to each claim” (emphasis added)).
80. See Brief for the Respondent in Opposition at 6, Cuozzo Speed Techs.,
LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (2016) (No. 15-446), 2015 WL 8621635, at *6
(arguing that “because § 314(d) is unnecessary to limit interlocutory appeals, it
must be read to bar review of all institution decisions, even after the Board
issues a final decision.”).
81. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“The stated purpose of the ‘final and
nonappealable’ provision is to control interlocutory delay and harassing
filings.”); Brief for the Petitioner at 46, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No. 15-446),
2016 WL 737452, at *46. A petitioner to whom the PTAB had denied review
was, of course, similarly unable to appeal the unfavorable decision, but strictly
speaking, such a review would not have been interlocutory; the decision not to
proceed would have been a final agency action otherwise subject to judicial
review.
82. See FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 246 (1980) (“[T]he
issuance of the complaint averring reason to believe is a step toward, and will
merge in, the Commission’s decision on the merits.”).
83. See Brief for the Petitioner, Cuozzo, supra note 81, at 46–48 (discussing
the justifications for the types of issues that may be subject to reviewability).
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For a petitioner who was incorrectly denied review, meanwhile,
there would be no distinction between interlocutory or final
judgment review.84 The PTAB decision not to proceed would
simply end the case with no appeal.85
The other, more expansive view was that the
nonappealability of the PTAB’s screening decision barred more
than just interlocutory review: the screening decision was
unreviewable even after a final decision by the PTAB on the
merits of the case.86 In defending the PTAB’s practice, this latter
expansive position was the view of agency power that the Patent
Office took before the Federal Circuit.87 It remained the view of
agency power that the Solicitor General, in coordination with the
Patent Office, took before the Supreme Court.88
The upshot of the agency’s argument was not only to
immunize itself from immediate judicial interference with the
PTAB’s actual decision to proceed with a review or not.89 That
much the statute itself unambiguously provided.90 The agency’s
approach also immunized it from judicial scrutiny of additional
legal issues related to the screening process, including express
statutory limits on the circumstances under which a petition
“may be considered” at all by the agency,91 like the requirement

84. See id. at 46 (“Once the Board institutes IPR, it invalidates more than
four out of every five patent claims that reach a final decision.”).
85. See id. at 46 (“In a real sense, the Board’s decision whether to institute
IPR is the most critical stage of the proceeding.”).
86. See In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d at 1273 (concluding that “§ 314(d) prohibits
review of the decision to institute IPR even after a final decision”).
87. See Brief for Intervenor-Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office at 30–33, In re Cuozzo, 793 F.3d 1268 (No. 2014-1301), 2016
WL 737452, at *26 (taking the position that “[the PTAB’s decision], by statute,
is ‘final and nonappealable,’ so [the] Court lacks the jurisdiction to consider it”).
88. See Brief for the Respondent at 44–50, Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. 2131 (No.
15-446), 2016 WL 1165967, at *34 (maintaining a broad view of the agency’s
discretion over the decision).
89. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (2018) (“The determination by the Director
whether to institute an inter partes review under this section shall be final and
nonappealable.”).
90. Id.
91. See id. § 312(a) (describing the situations in which a petition “may be
considered”).
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that such consideration was available “only if” the petition
satisfied the particularity requirement.92
The Supreme Court in Cuozzo v. Lee ultimately ruled in favor
of the Patent Office, concluding that the particularity
requirement was merely an ordinary element of the screening of
petitions, and its analytical proximity to the screening decision
swept this legal question into the ambit of unreviewable agency
discretion.93 The Court majority in Cuozzo also expressed concern
that allowing eventual judicial review over agency enforcement of
the particularity requirement would hamper the ability of the
Patent Office to “revisit and revise earlier patent grants”
efficiently.94
Although the Court’s concern about efficient reevaluation of
patent validity was well founded, it is questionable whether
vindicating that concern required the far-reaching outcome in
Cuozzo. For example, the more modest view of nonappealability,
as a bar on interlocutory review, would also have protected PTAB
adjudications from disruptive scrutiny.95 The Federal Circuit
would not have been able to step in before the PTAB had a chance
to conduct its review of the merits in a case. Eventual review of
the initial screening decision may, at the margin, have allowed a
final agency decision to “be unwound under some minor statutory
technicality.”96 Still, the Court seemed not to appreciate that this
sort of problem would likely arise only in early appellate
reversals.97 The agency would learn quickly—indeed, would be
forced to learn quickly—from these unwindings and would
conform to its supervising court’s precedents.
92. See id. § 312(a)(3) (“[T]he petition identifies, in writing and with
particularity, each claim challenged . . . .”) (emphasis added).
93. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2139 (2016)
(explaining that “the legal dispute at issue is an ordinary dispute about the
application of certain relevant patent statutes concerning the Patent Office’s
decision to institute inter partes review”).
94. See id. at 2139–40 (“[A] contrary holding would undercut one important
congressional objective, namely, giving the Patent Office significant power to
revisit and revise earlier patent grants.”).
95. See id. at 2151 (Alito, J., dissenting) (interpreting the word
“nonappealable” narrowly).
96. Id. at 2140.
97. See id. at 2140–42 (discussing the danger that appealability presents
for the functioning of the Patent Office).
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Ultimately, the Court’s desire not to undercut the important
legislative objective of efficient patent validity reevaluation
proved too much. By this reasoning, which Justice Alito
articulated in dissent, the Court could “do away with judicial
review whenever [it thought] that review makes it harder for an
agency to carry out important work.”98 Congress did give the
Patent Office significant new power to reevaluate patent validity,
but also prescribed certain means and proscribed certain others
in reaching that objective.99
Finally, the Court’s conception of the actual relationship
between screening and adjudication repays close scrutiny.100 In
response to the argument that the Patent Office had improperly
accepted a petition that was not pled with the necessary
particularity, the Court concluded that complaints regarding the
quality or adequacy of evidence (i.e., issues related to
adjudicating the merits of an argument) “can always be recast as
a complaint that the . . . presentation was incomplete or
misleading” (i.e., recast as issues related to screening the viability
of an argument).101 In other words, the Court recognized that
screening the likely viability of a petition and adjudicating its
merits overlap considerably, and the danger of sweeping
adjudication-related issues into the domain of screening is real,
with the availability of judicial review at stake.102 However,
rather than err prudently on the side of judicial oversight as the
presumption of reviewability would counsel,103 the Court took
otherwise reviewable adjudication-related issues and placed them

98. Id. at 2151 (Alito, J., dissenting).
99. See id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (recounting that “no legislation pursues its
purposes at all costs” (citing Rodriguez v. United States, 480 U.S. 522, 525–26
(1987) (per curiam))).
100. See id. at 2140–42 (discussing the relationship between screening and
adjudication).
101. Id. at 2142 (citing United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
102. See id. (recognizing that adjudicatory and screening concerns often
overlap in issues relating to the review of the Patent Office’s determinations).
103. See id. at 2150 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“If a provision can reasonably be
read to permit judicial review, it should be.”).
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alongside screening-related issues, beyond the ability of courts to
discipline.104
On its own terms, the Cuozzo opinion reflected potential
limits on how much unreviewable discretion the Patent Office
actually has. Review may still be available, or not, for appeals
that (1) “implicate constitutional questions,” (2) “depend on other
less closely related statutes,” or (3) “present other questions of
interpretation that reach, in terms of scope and impact, well
beyond [the nonappealability statute].”105 Still, the practical
reach of the Cuozzo decision remains unclear. How analytically
separable from the institution decision can a statutory provision
be and still be treated as a screening-related issue that the courts
cannot review?
C. Resisting Review of Statutory Boundaries
The first substantial answer to this question came from a
decision of the en banc Federal Circuit about another statutory
limit on the power of the Patent Office to reevaluate patent
validity. The case, Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp.,106
pertained to the one-year time limit within which a defendant
who is charged in a civil action with infringing a patent must
bring a petition for inter partes review of that patent or else forgo
agency adjudication entirely.107
The one-year time bar at issue in Wi-Fi One was an apt test
of how far the Court’s logic in Cuozzo could extend in practice.
Like the particularity requirement at issue in Cuozzo itself,108 the
one-year time bar could be understood possibly as a
104. See id. at 2150–53 (Alito, J., dissenting) (describing the ramifications of
the Court’s rejection of the presumption of reviewability).
105. See id. at 2141 (outlining the instances in which application of the
Court’s interpretation of the statute is not necessarily warranted).
106. 878 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (rehearing en banc).
107. See id. at 1367; see also 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (2018) (“An inter partes
review may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed
more than 1 year after the date on which [the party] is served with a complaint
alleging infringement of the patent.”).
108. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2137 (2016)
(highlighting the “applicable patent law requirements” for the purposes of
review).
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screening-related issue beyond the reach of judicial review.109 It
could also, more properly, be understood as an analytically
distinct statutory limit on the agency’s power to adjudicate patent
validity—power that is, indeed, subject to judicial review. The
Federal Circuit’s own precedent on the question treated the
one-year time bar as unreviewable.110 The Patent Office agreed
and sought to follow its success in Cuozzo with even broader
scope for nonappealability.111
The en banc question presented was whether to overrule the
governing panel precedent.112 A decisive 9–4 majority did
overrule it, holding that the PTAB’s application of the one-year
time bar is, indeed, subject to judicial review.113
The dispute in Wi-Fi One implicated an important distinction
between screening PTAB petitions and adjudicating them.114 The
availability of administrative review in the Patent Office as a
substitute for federal-court litigation has direct effects both on
individual case outcomes and on the patent system more
generally.115 It was necessary, therefore, for the Federal Circuit to
109. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1371 (acknowledging the panel’s view in
holding the time-bar challenges to be unreviewable).
110. See Achates Reference Publ’g, Inc. v. Apple Inc., 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (holding that the statute “prohibits this court from reviewing the
Board’s determination to initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the
time-bar of [the statute]”).
111. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1373 (weighing the merits of “the PTO’s
position that the time-bar determination is unreviewable”).
112. See id. at 1367 (asking whether the court should overrule Achates and
hold that judicial review is available for a patent owner to challenge the PTO’s
determination).
113. See id. at 1367 (holding that the time-bar determinations under the
statute are appealable, overruling Achates).
114. The arguments summarized in this Part are more fully developed in a
related article. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Porous Court-Agency Border in
Patent Law, 51 AKRON L. REV. 1069 (2018) [hereinafter Porous Court-Agency
Border] (analyzing the “weakening border” between administrative and judicial
reviewability) These arguments are also further developed in an amicus curiae
brief filed in the Wi-Fi One case itself. See Brief of Amici Curiae Professors of
Patent and Administrative Law in Support of Neither Party, Wi-Fi One, 878
F.3d 1364 (Nos. 15-1944, 15-1945, 15-1946) [hereinafter Professors’ Amicus
Brief in Wi-Fi] (discussing the development of reviewability in the realm of
PTAB determinations).
115. See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1090–92
(discussing the possible ramifications of the Wi-Fi One decision).
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take into account these effects of Patent Office validity reviews
because the Court in Cuozzo had emphasized these sorts of
functional considerations in deciding whether judicial review is
available.116 Indeed, the substitution of Patent Office proceedings
for the traditional modes of federal court resolution was not
merely Congress’s intended use for the AIA.117 It is also the result
actually observed in practice.
Litigants use inter partes review and covered business
method review as strategic substitutes for litigation in two
important ways.118 One is the standard model of substitution, in
which a defendant sued in district court for infringing a patent
brings a petition in the agency to challenge that patent.119 In
contrast to this defensive posture is the nonstandard model of
substitution, in which a party brings a preemptive challenge
against a patent on which it has not yet been sued.120 Litigants
use each form of substitution differently, with variation across
technology and other factors.121 These differences also rest in
significant part on statutory boundaries that the AIA drew
between courts and the Patent Office.122 The one-year time bar of
§ 315(b) is one of the most important of these boundaries, which
116. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141 (distancing the Court’s decision on the
issue of particularity from other legal issues based on their potential “scope and
impact”).
117. See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (rehearing en banc) (O’Malley, C.J., concurring) (highlighting that
Congress chose to afford patent owners with the “important procedural right” of
“judicial review of erroneous determinations by the PTO”).
118. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 64–77. (noting that
litigants use post-grant review in essentially the same ways, to a lesser but
growing extent); see also generally Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent
Validity Proceeding: Evaluating Post-Grant Review, 24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J.
333, 335 (2016) [hereinafter Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding] (evaluating
the institutional features of “ex post patent validity review in the administrative
agency setting of the USPTO”).
119. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 49 (outlining efficiency
as a major normative argument for administrative ex post review).
120. See id. (delineating the two common scenarios in which patent
challenges are brought).
121. See id. (surveying the methods that petitions use standard and
non-standard substitution).
122. See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1075 (“By the time
of the AIA’s enactment, however, Congress was prepared to shape the border
between courts and the Patent Office more actively . . . .”).
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force a choice between seeking administrative review or
proceeding in an Article III court.123
As to degrees of usage, standard petitioners account for a
large majority (seventy percent) of those who seek inter partes
review.124 Similarly, among all the patents being challenged in
PTAB review, a large majority (eighty-seven percent) are also
simultaneously being asserted in court litigation.125 Meanwhile,
the thirty percent of those seeking inter partes review who are
nonstandard petitioners nevertheless constitute a substantial
minority.126 Of particular salience to these different levels of use
between standard and nonstandard petitioning is coordination
among those who mount administrative patent challenges.127 The
nature of their coordination reveals that the Patent Office is the
locus of significant collective action in a way that courts have long
been unable to achieve.128
Because a patent invalidation judgment in court renders the
patented invention free not only to the successful challenger but
to all others,129 even those would-be free riders who did not
contribute to the challenge, such judgments become a type of
public good.130 Meanwhile, those who are positioned to mount
123. See id. (discussing the various avenues through which Congress
actively engaged in delineating the line between the Patent Office and the
courts).
124. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 73 (“[T]he majority
(70%) of IPR petitioners have previously been defendants in district court
litigations involving the patents they now challenge.”).
125. See id. at 69 (“[A]bout 86.8% of IPR- or CBM-challenged patents are
also being litigated in the federal courts.”).
126. See id. at 73 (outlining “the remaining 30% of cases” in which
petitioners are not prior defendants).
127. See id. at 74–75 (discussing the possible social and juridical
repercussions of “collective action” as a method to challenge invalid patents).
128. See id. (noting the explicit mission of certain organizations to bring
collective challenges to patents in the Patent Office).
129. See Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971) (stating that res judicata and collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses
available to be plead in patent claims).
130. See Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage
Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004)
(assessing the aftermath of the Blonder-Tongue holding and the possibility that
the rule “turns patent invalidity judgements into public goods”).
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court challenges to patent validity at all must satisfy stringent
Article III standing requirements.131 Their “particularized stake”
in the patent, on which their standing to sue rests, is often of a
piece with their incentives to appropriate the full value of their
investments in litigation, and tend to exclude those would-be
challengers who might raise patent challenges in what they see
as the broader public interest.132 A single challenger or a small
group of challengers is unlikely ever to fully capture the value of
its successful judicial decree of patent validity, and economic
theory suggests that collective action against questionable
patents will likely be undersupplied.133 By allowing Patent Office
validity challenges with no standing requirement, the AIA has
lowered the entry cost of engaging in this sort of collective
action.134
The way in which this collective action in Patent Office
proceedings actually plays out is through the PTAB’s joinder
rules, which authorize the Director to consolidate into a single
case any other party that has properly filed a petition of its own
warranting review.135 Across the population of inter partes
reviews generally and especially in certain technology areas,
there is considerable joinder among standard and nonstandard

131. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)
(summarizing that plaintiffs seeking a declaratory judgment on patent validity
must show that there is “a substantial controversy, between parties having
adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgement”).
132. See Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 498, 536–37 (2015) (considering standing in relation to the
circumstances in which consumer patent actions may be appropriate); see also
Sapna Kumar, Gene Patents and Patient Rights, 35 WHITTIER L. REV. 363,
370 – 72 (2014) (discussing the problem of standing specifically in challenging
genetics- and genomics-related patents).
133. See Miller, supra note 130, at 687–88 (weighing the incentives and
disincentives of patent validity challenges); see also Burstein, supra note 132, at
542–48 (demonstrating the “[m]isalignment [b]etween [c]urrent [s]tanding
[r]ules and [i]ncentives to [b]ring [p]atent [c]hallenges”).
134. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 49–50 (contemplating
administrative alternatives as one possible solution to the “collective action
problem” presented by “expensive Article III litigation”).
135. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(c), 325(c) (2018) (granting the Director the
discretion to “join as a party to the inter partes review any person who properly
files a petition”).
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petitioners.136 For example, for drug and medical-related patents,
48.5% of inter partes review petitioners are standard petitioners
acting in a defensive posture.137 Among patents in the same field
of technology, however, 70.8% of the inter partes review petitions
actually filed had at least one standard petitioner associated with
it.138 Similarly, the observed petitioners petition disparity for
mechanical-related patents is 53.1% versus 70.2%.139 These large
joinder gaps suggest that nonstandard petitioners join petitions
that standard petitioners have filed.140
Such joinders are permitted, of course, only if each
underlying petition “warrants the institution of an inter partes
review under section 314.”141 In other words, whether standard or
nonstandard, every petition must satisfy, among other things, the
one-year time bar of § 315(b) in order to be considered for
joinder.142 The statutory boundaries between courts and the
Patent Office give direct shape to the strategic uses that litigants
make of these administrative proceedings.143
As a result, in the language of Cuozzo, the “scope and impact”
of the one-year time bar extend necessarily beyond the walls of
the Patent Office and into the courts.144 Ensuring compliance
with the one-year time bar is certainly a necessary element of
how the Patent Office must screen petitions, and this may
136. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 74 (“[I]n each of these
technology areas, petitioners who are not prior defendants are joining petitions
filed by prior defendants.”).
137. See id. at 102–03 (displaying graphically the distribution of IPR
petitioners that were defendants in a prior suit on the same patent, by
technology).
138. See id. (displaying graphically the distribution of IPR petitions that
included at least one standard petitioner).
139. See id. (showing the disparity in the amount of standard petitioners
across different technologies).
140. See id. at 74 (“The disparities reveal that, in each of these technology
areas, petitioners who are not prior defendants are joining petitions filed by
prior defendants.”).
141. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c).
142. See id. (outlining the requirements for joiner in IPR).
143. See generally Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8.
144. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2141 (2016)
(considering the effects of appeals in cases in which statutes present
constitutional questions or far reaching interpretive questions).
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suggest that the agency should enjoy unreviewable discretion in
the matter.145 However, the larger power-allocation function that
the one-year time bar serves as between the courts and the
agency counsels strongly in favor of judicial review.146 This
functional approach, for better or worse, was one that the Court
itself articulated in Cuozzo.147
What was clear after Cuozzo was that, for a statutory limit
on the Patent Office’s screening power to be judicially reviewable,
the limit had to be more than just analytically separable from the
screening decision itself; it had to be separable by enough.148 By
concluding that the one-year time bar is, indeed, separable by
enough—and is accordingly subject to judicial review149—the en
banc Federal Circuit produced two important benefits. First, it
did much to clarify what the necessary and sufficient conditions
are for that separability. Second, it placed a necessary brake on
the Patent Office campaign of enlarging its sphere of
nonappealability, though that campaign still had one further
engagement.
D. Resisting Review of Adjudicatory Obligations
While the Federal Circuit was considering Wi-Fi One, the
Supreme Court considered yet another case that implicated the
agency’s conflation of screening with adjudication. At issue in
145. See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (rehearing en banc) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the
timeliness requirement contained in the statute is “closely tied to the Director’s
decision to institute” and “is part of the Board’s institution decision, and is
therefore barred from judicial review”).
146. See id. at 1377 (O’Malley, C.J., concurring) (“Allowing judicial review of
erroneous determinations by the PTO as to whether the [statutory] time bar
applies would prevent the agency from ‘act[ing] outside its statutory limits,’ one
of the categories of ‘shenanigans’ envisioned by the majority in Cuozzo.” (citing
Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141–42)).
147. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1377 (O’Malley, C.J., concurring) (discussing
situations in which judicial appeals would be warranted); see generally Porous
Court-Agency Border, supra note 114.
148. See Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2141 (distinguishing nonreviewable
“screening” limits from reviewable limits “less closely related” to screening).
149. See Wi-Fi One, 878 F.3d at 1374 (concluding that “the statutory scheme
as a whole demonstrates that § 315 is not ‘closely related’ to the institution
decision . . . and it therefore is not subject to [the bar] on judicial review”).
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SAS Institute Inc. v. Iancu150 was the statutory requirement that
the PTAB, as adjudicator, “shall issue a final written decision
with respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged
by the petitioner.”151 Indeed, although the dispute in Wi-Fi One
was quite well suited to testing the analytical reach of Cuozzo,
the question on which the Court granted certiorari in SAS
Institute directly exposed what the Patent Office actually gained
by conflating the power to screen petitions with the power to
adjudicate them.152
The contested agency practice in SAS Institute was the
routine issuance by the PTAB of final written decisions that
address only some of the patent claims that the petitioner
challenged.153 In its exercise of screening power, the PTAB
frequently granted a petition in part and denied it in part,
proceeding with review only as to certain patent claims or
grounds.154 At the end of trial, the PTAB’s final written decision
adjudicated only those patent claims upon which the agency had
initially granted review.155 The remaining patent claims from the
initial petition, which had been filtered out up front, were not
addressed.156 The Patent Office argued that it was free to cherrypick from petitions and to adjudicate fewer than all of the claims
the petitioner had challenged.157 Governing Federal Circuit
precedent said the same, including the panel decision in the SAS
150. 138 S. Ct. 1348 (2018).
151. Id. at 1354 (citing 35 U.S.C. § 318(a)).
152. Id.
153. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC (SAS Inst. I), 825 F.3d
1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (asking if “a final written decision by the Board
[must] address every patent claim challenged in an IPR petition”).
154. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.108 (2019) (providing that “the Board may authorize
the review to proceed on all or some of the challenged claims and on all or some
of the grounds of unpatentability asserted for each claim”).
155. See SAS Inst. II, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (“At the end of litigation, the Board
issued a final written decision finding claims 1, 3, and 5–10 to be unpatentable
while upholding claim 4.”); see also Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814
F.3d 1309, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that “the final order of the Board need
not address every claim raised in the petition for review”).
156. See SAS Inst. II, 138 S. Ct. at 1354 (“[T]he Board’s decision did not
address the remaining claims on which the Director had refused review.”).
157. See id. at 1355 (“In the Director’s view, he retains discretion to decide
which claims make it into an inter partes review and which don’t.”).
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Institute case itself.158 Governing Federal Circuit precedent said
the same, including the panel decision in the SAS Institute case
itself.159
The Court rejected the position of the Patent Office and
Federal Circuit, holding that the practice of partial institution
was outside the statutory limits of the agency’s authority.160
Accordingly, the Court also stated that the necessary scope of
PTAB final written decisions cannot be narrowed by filtering out
claims and arguments at the front end.161 And to reach both of
these conclusions, the Court concluded as an initial matter that
even though partial institution arose squarely in the exercise of
the agency’s screening power, that alone did not render the
practice unreviewable.162 Under the framework of Cuozzo, the
issue of partial institution represented agency action “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations” and so was well
within the “strong presumption in favor of judicial review.”163
As in Cuozzo and Wi-Fi One, what was notable about the
framing of SAS Institute was neither the argument of the
petitioner164 nor the controlling Federal Circuit precedent that
was sought to be overturned.165 Instead, it was the litigation
158. See SAS Inst. I, 825 F.3d at 1352–53 (rejecting SAS’s argument that the
Board erred by not addressing every claim).
159. See id. (rejecting SAS’s argument that the Board erred by not
addressing every claim).
160. See SAS Inst. II, 138 S. Ct. at 1359 (“[E]verything in the statute before
us confirms that SAS is entitled to a final written decision addressing all of the
claims it has challenged . . . .”).
161. See id. (agreeing with SAS’ contention that “the Director exceeded his
statutory authority by limiting the review to fewer than all of the claims SAS
challenged”).
162. See id. at 1359–60 (“[J]udicial review remains available consistent with
the Administrative Procedure Act, which directs courts to set aside agency
action ‘not in accordance with law’ or ‘in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations.’”).
163. Id. at 1360.
164. In this case, SAS Institute was both the PTAB petitioner seeking inter
partes review in the PTAB and, eventually, the petitioner seeking certiorari in
the Supreme Court. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4–5, SAS Inst. Inc. v.
Lee, (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 491052 (U.S., Jan. 31, 2017) (noting that SAS
petitioned for inter partes review of a patent and challenged patentability of all
sixteen of the patent’s claims).
165. See SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018) (granting
certiorari to review the Federal Circuit’s rejection of SAS’ argument that “35
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position of the Patent Office—this time, about its underlying
obligation of full and reasoned decision-making.166
The agency argument went essentially like this. Every
administrative trial that results in a final written decision has
gone through an initial screening.167 That initial screening and
the resulting choice to proceed are immune from judicial review,
including any agency choice to proceed as to part of the petition
rather than all of it.168 Therefore, if the final written decision
omits discussion of any part of the petition, that omission is
unreviewable because it originates in the agency’s unreviewable
screening choices.169 Put another way, the Patent Office argued
that even a statutory requirement pertaining directly to
adjudication—which is subject to ordinary judicial review—can
be made unreviewable by connecting some aspect of the
adjudicatory task to the earlier threshold screening task.
This remarkable claim of agency power had appeared before.
In the now-controlling Federal Circuit case that approved partial
final written decisions by the PTAB, Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor
Graphics Corp.,170 the Patent Office did not merely argue that its
practice was entitled to deference under the Chevron doctrine for
its reasonable resolution of ambiguous statutory language.171
U.S.C. § 318(a) required the Board to decide the patentability of every claim
SAS challenged in its petition, not just some”).
166. See id. (explaining that 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (2018) obligates the Board to
resolve the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner).
167. See id. at 1356 (noting that 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) requires the Director to
initially decide whether the petitioner is likely to succeed on “at least 1” claim).
168. See id. at 1359 (stating that 35 U.S.C. “§ 314(d) precludes judicial
review only of the Director’s ‘initial determination’ under § 314(a) that there is a
‘reasonable likelihood’ that the claims are unpatentable on the grounds asserted
and review is therefore justified”).
169. See Brief for Respondent ComplementSoft, LLC at 24, SAS Inst. Inc. v.
Matal, 138 S. Ct. 350 (2017) (No. 16-969), 2017 WL 3948186 (“Faced with a
petition that meets its burden as to some claims but not others, the Board has
basically unreviewable discretion to deny the IPR in full, rather than waste its
limited resources addressing claims for which the petitioner has not shown even
a reasonable likelihood of success . . . .”).
170. 814 F.3d 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
171. See id. at 1316 (opining that the regulation “setting forth the standards
for the showing of sufficient grounds to institute” inter partes review is a
“reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision governing the institution of
inter partes review” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
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Foremost, the agency argued that even the scope of its
adjudication was unreviewable and that there was no jurisdiction
even to hear the appeal.172 The Federal Circuit disagreed, and the
Synopsys precedent that SAS Institute went on to challenge
rested primarily on a theory of Chevron deference amid
competing constructions of the statute prescribing final written
decisions.173
The competing statutory constructions also implicated the
presumption that agency actions are reviewable, in the same way
as Justice Alito’s dissent in Cuozzo had explained.174 The Federal
Circuit in Synopsys gave great weight to the seeming difference
in text between the screening and adjudication statutes for inter
partes review.175 The former provides that a petition shall not be
accepted for review absent a “reasonable likelihood that the
petitioner would prevail with respect to at least 1 of the claims
challenged in the petition.”176 The latter provides that a final
written decision must address “any patent claim challenged by
the petitioner and any new claim added under section 316(d).”177
The latter also makes the issuance of a final written decision
conditional, requiring it “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted
and not dismissed under this chapter.”178
467 U.S. 837 (1984))).
172. See id. at 1314 (“The decision of the Board to institute inter partes
review cannot be appealed.”); Brief for Intervenor–Director of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office at 14–15, Synopsys, 184 F.3d 1309 (Nos.
2014-1516, 2014-1530), 2015 WL 1029522 (arguing that the institution decision
is not reviewable because Congress authorized “this Court to review only the
Board’s final written decision as to patentability” (citing 35 U.S.C. §§ 319,
318(a))).
173. See Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1316 (stating that, under Chevron, the PTO’s
regulation allowing the Board to institute as to some or all of the claims is a
reasonable interpretation of the statutory provision governing the institution of
inter partes review).
174. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016)
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If a provision can
reasonably be read to permit judicial review, it should be.”).
175. See Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1314–15 (“Congress explicitly chose to use a
different phrase when describing claims raised in the petition for inter partes
review in § 314(a) and claims on which inter partes review has been instituted
in § 318(a).”).
176. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018) (emphasis added).
177. Id. § 318(a) (emphasis added).
178. Id.
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From these provisions, both the Patent Office and the
Federal Circuit had inferred legislative intent that patent claims
on which a final written decision is required are different from
patent claims that undergo initial screening. The reasoning was
that Congress had used the phrase “claims challenged by the
petitioner” to distinguish from “claims challenged in the
petition.”179 To reach this conclusion, however, the Federal
Circuit had ignored the rest of the statutory text. Because the
patent owner itself may introduce amended patent claims during
the proceeding,180 the final written decision must address not only
what was initially challenged in the patent (and subjected to
screening), but also what was later amended into the patent.181
Thus, a more immediately sensible reading is that Congress used
the phrase “claims challenged by the petitioner” to distinguish
from new claims added by the patent owner—and to clarify that
the final written decision must address both.182 The upshot of this
reading was that screening and adjudication would remain
analytically separate, and adjudication would remain subject to
judicial review.183
Similarly, the Federal Circuit had taken the conditional
phrase “[i]f an inter partes review is instituted” and inferred from
it that Congress intended to limit final written decisions not
merely to cases that are instituted, but to the extent that they are
instituted.184 This, too, ignored the language that comes next.
179. See Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1315 (explaining that at the first stage, the
Board reviews “claims challenged by the petitioner” while at the second stage,
the Board issues a decision as to “claims challenged in the petition” (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 314(a) (2018); id. § 318(a))).
180. See 35 U.S.C. § 316(d) (during IPR the patent owner can amend the
patent by canceling a claim or offering “reasonable substitute claims”).
181. Id. § 318(a).
182. See id. (stating that the Board “shall issue a final written decision with
respect to the patentability of any patent claim challenged by the petitioner and
any new claim added under section 316(d)”).
183. See 35 U.S.C. § 319 (“A party dissatisfied with the final written decision
of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board under section 318(a) may appeal the
decision . . . .”).
184. See Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1315 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (concluding that this conditional phrase in the statute “strongly
suggests that the ‘challenged’ claims referenced are the claims for which inter
partes review was instituted, not every claim challenged in the petition”).
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Another sensible reading was that Congress intended not to
require final written decisions where review was dismissed
through, e.g., settlement.185 This would have reflected a sound
desire for economy in PTAB resources. Indeed, the statute that
governs settlement of inter partes review directly invokes judicial
economy by providing for termination “unless the Office has
decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for
termination is filed.”186
On both lines of reasoning, then, the statute governing final
written decisions could reasonably—indeed, most sensibly—have
been read in a way that respects the presumption of
reviewability. For that reason alone, the Court’s eventual
decision in SAS Institute was correct.187 If instead the Patent
Office’s resurrected argument from Synopsys had prevailed, it
would have been difficult to imagine what meaningful sphere of
judicial supervision could long remain over administrative patent
validity review. It is straightforward to connect PTAB screening
to any number of downstream adjudicatory issues. If this logic
could put even ordinary requirements of complete and reasoned
agency decision-making beyond the reach of courts, then the
statute furthest from initial screening would be “closely related”
enough under Cuozzo to preclude review.188 Either such an
outcome would have been a significant misreading of Cuozzo, or
else the Court’s assurances in Cuozzo would, indeed, have rung
hollow.189

185. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(a) (codifying settlement protocol of inter partes
review).
186. Id.
187. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2150 (2016)
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“If a provision can
reasonably be read to permit judicial review, it should be.”).
188. See id. at 2141 (“[W]e need not, and do not, decide the precise effect of
§ 314(d) on appeals that implicate constitutional questions, that depend on other
less closely related statutes . . . .”).
189. See id. (“[W]e do not categorically preclude review of a final decision
where a petition fails to give ‘sufficient notice’ such that there is a due process
problem with the entire proceeding, nor does our interpretation enable the
agency to act outside its statutory limits . . . .”).
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III. Effects of Aggrandized Agency Power
Part
II
recounted
the
agency’s
trajectory
of
self-aggrandizement at the expense of the courts, both through
administrative panel stacking to reach desirable case outcomes
and through increasingly expansive positions about its immunity
from judicial review. This Part reveals just what the agency
stands to gain from these unusually aggressive policies, as well as
what systemic harms these policies inflict. Part III.A discusses
the benefits that accrue to the Patent Office, benefits that largely
work to solidify recent enlargements of the agency’s power. Part
III.B discusses several systemic harms that these agency choices
have imposed and continue to impose. Part III.C explores
alternatives other than judicial review that might be expected to
discipline questionable Patent Office choices, but concludes that
these are inadequate in a system where patent rights are
managed through a decentralized process of adjudication.
A. Resulting Agency Benefits
Both sets of benefits to the Patent Office are roughly the
same. The agency has used panel stacking as a basis for Chevron
deference, signaling an important departure from recent
practice.190 The persistent and increasingly broad arguments
about nonappealability are similarly aimed at securing greater
autonomy from the courts, but simply under the heading of
unreviewable discretion rather than deference.191

190. See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the
Era of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1573 (2016) (noting that the
agency has argued that it is entitled to Chevron deference because a rule
governing post-grant proceedings “allow[s] decisions regarding preliminary
institution of review and final decisions to be made by the same panel”).
191. See id. (“[T]he agency has asserted that the [America Invents Act of
2011] effectively insulates the PTAB’s preliminary institution of review
decisions from judicial review, even when the PTAB’s final decision on the
merits is later appealed.”).
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1. Chevron Deference from Panel Stacking

An important effect of Patent Office aggrandizement is that
the agency has begun using panel stacking as a basis to seek
Chevron deference for PTAB decisions.192 This marks a shift in
Patent Office policy, which until recently had been characterized
by a reluctance to “expend political capital in generating
Chevron-ready opinions.”193 The necessary and sufficient
conditions within the PTAB for Chevron deference to apply are
contested.194 Still, the Patent Office procedures for designating
PTAB opinions as precedential likely satisfy these conditions.195
The practice of panel stacking likely does not.
The familiar starting points for whether Chevron is
applicable are a delegation by Congress of authority for an agency
to “speak with the force of law” and an exercise by the agency of
that authority.196 In practice, speaking with the force of law may
impose a high bar for adjudicatory orders, as Thomas Merrill and
Kristin Hickman have proposed.197 On this view, the order must
be binding not only on the parties involved but also on others
inside the agency, i.e., must be reviewed by the agency head and

192. See id. at 1574 (explaining “[t]he PTO has repeatedly claimed Chevron
deference for its rules governing post-grant proceedings” which “allow decisions
regarding preliminary institution of review and final decisions to be made by the
same panel”).
193. See id. at 1590, 1596 (opining that the PTO has failed to “place itself in
the strongest position for receiving Chevron deference”).
194. See id. at 1581–84 (summarizing the debate over whether
“adjudications overseen by agency heads and/or treated as precedential by the
agency” are the only adjudications that merit Chevron deference). The
discussion that follows is adapted from Professors Benjamin and Rai’s
summary.
195. See id. at 1584–85 (“PTAB procedures resemble the sort of
uncoordinated decision-making process that Mead identified as an indicator of
decisions that lack the force of law.”).
196. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219, 226–27 (2001)
(stating that such delegation can be apparent when “Congress would expect the
agency to be able to speak with the force of law when addressing ambiguity in
the statute or fills a space in the enacted law”).
197. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89
GEO. L.J. 833, 908 (2001) (arguing that “initial decisions are merely
recommendations to a higher body within the agency” and are not entitled to
Chevron deference).
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carry precedential force upon other agency adjudications.198
Alternatively, adjudicatory orders deserve Chevron deference
virtually routinely, as Cass Sunstein has proposed.199 On this
view, the order need bind only the parties involved, as
adjudicatory orders generally do.200 This debate is also the subject
of a circuit split. At one side are the Second, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits consistent with Merrill and Hickman’s approach.201 At
the other side is the Eleventh Circuit consistent with Sunstein’s
approach.202
As applied to the Patent Office, John Golden has argued that
the stricter standard is appropriate for routine PTAB opinions
and that such opinions would likely fail under Chevron
deference.203 Benjamin and Rai agree to some extent, as routine
PTAB opinions “resemble the sort of uncoordinated
decision-making process that Mead identified as an indicator of
198. See id. (“An adjudicatory order should be understood to have the ‘force
of law’ in this context only if it is legally binding both inside the agency (that is,
binding on other agency personnel) and outside the agency (that is, binding on
the parties to the adjudication).”).
199. See Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 222 (2006)
(“Chevron deference is inferred from the grant of power to make decisions that
people violate at their peril.”).
200. See id. at 222 (“[A]n agency decision may be taken to have the ‘force of
law’ when it is binding on private parties in the sense that those who act in
violation of the decision face immediate sanctions.”).
201. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1584–85 nn.129, 132 & 134
(declining to extend Chevron deference to “any statutory construction of the
[Immigration and Nationality Act] set forth in a summarily affirmed
[immigration judge] opinion” (citing Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 184
(2d Cir. 2005)); see also Lagandaon v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2004)
(finding that review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of the
INA is not precluded where it entailed no exercise of discretion); Olson v. Fed.
Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 381 F.3d 1007 (10th Cir. 2004) (stating
that an ALJ decision that has not been reviewed by the Federal Mine Safety and
Health Review Commission is not entitled to Chevron deference).
202. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1585 n.135 (noting that the
Eleventh Circuit in Florida Medical Center “afforded Chevron deference to an
ALJ decision that was not subject to higher-level review” (citing Fla. Med. Ctr.
of Clearwater, Inc. v. Sebelius, 614 F.3d 1276 (11th Cir. 2010))).
203. See John Golden, Working Without Chevron: The PTO as Prime Mover,
65 DUKE L.J. 1657, 1685 (2016) (“PTAB decisions in inter partes, covered
business method, and post-grant review are unlikely to be viewed as warranting
Chevron deference.”).
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decisions that lack the force of law.”204 They ultimately conclude,
however, that the Patent Office Director’s necessary review and
approval in designating PTAB opinions as precedential does
make those opinions eligible for Chevron even under the more
stringent view of Mead that Merrill, Hickman, and Golden
take.205
The case of panel stacking is murkier. The statutory
authority of the Director includes the ability to designate PTAB
panels of “at least” three PTAB members.206 Similarly, the
Director and other agency leadership are themselves members of
the PTAB by statute.207 This suggests, on first impression, that
politically motivated designations of additional judges for
rehearings may be acceptable.208 But apart from whether the
Federal Circuit’s approval of this practice’s predecessor under the
facts of Alappat remains viable in the current structure of the
Patent Office209—and there is reason to believe it does not210—
panel stacking is also a dubious means for developing the
institutional coherence needed to speak with the force of law.
Yet this is precisely what the Patent Office has argued.211
One example is Yissum, the first of the three above-discussed
cases in which the agency confirmed its panel stacking practice to
the Federal Circuit.212 The Patent Office in that case sought
204. Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1585.
205. See id. at 1586 (noting that the PTO’s process “would seem to satisfy
the more demanding of the two interpretations of Mead”).
206. 35 U.S.C. § 6(c) (2018).
207. Id. § 6(a).
208. Id.
209. See infra Part II.A (explaining that the BPAI was the predecessor of the
PTAB and differed in important ways, making Alappat distinguishable from the
present context).
210. See infra Part III.B.1 (noting that the difference between Alappat’s
BPAI and today’s PTAB is directly relevant to the Director’s supervisory
authority over the policy choices reflected in administrative panel decisions).
211. Brief for Intervenor–Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office at 19–20, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the Hebrew Univ. of
Jerusalem v. Sony Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (Nos. 2015-1342,
2015-1343) [hereinafter Brief for USPTO] (arguing that the Board is entitled to
Chevron deference because the USPTO “has acted to ensure that its
pronouncements remain consistent” across multiple Board hearings).
212. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (showing that the agency
reconfigures panels in order to ensure that the Director’s policy position is being
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Chevron deference for its interpretation of how the statutory
joinder and one-year time bar statutes interact in inter partes
review proceedings.213 The joinder statute gives discretion to the
Director to join as a party to an instituted inter partes review
“any person who properly files a petition” that, in the Director’s
view, would itself have warranted review.214 The one-year time
bar, meanwhile, does not apply to “a request for joinder.”215
Patent owner Yissum distinguished between the joinder of
parties contemplated by the statute and the joinder of arguments,
which is unmentioned.216 Yissum argued that the agency had
previously granted late motions to join arguments but lately had
“flipped and then flopped,” noting that the statute permitting late
joinder of arguments was impermissible.217 The result, Yissum
urged, was an inconsistent agency position that was undeserving
of Chevron deference.218
The Patent Office maintained that its consistently held
position was to permit the late joinder of arguments.219 It is
supposed flip to forbidding such late joinders came from a panel

enforced by the panels).
213. See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 19 (arguing that “this Court
should defer to the Board’s reasonable interpretation of the statute here because
the statute is ambiguous” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)).
214. 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2018).
215. Id. § 315(b).
216. Yissum’s Opening Brief at 32–33, Yissum Research Dev. Co. of the
Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem v. Sony Corp., 626 F. App’x 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(Nos. 2015-1342, 2015-1343) (noting that “the statute ‘unambiguously does not’
permit late joinder of issues, and that the legislative history showed that
Congress intended only late joinder of parties, and not of issues”).
217. Id. The term “late motion” refers to a motion that comes after the
one-year time bar of § 315(b). See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b) (“An inter partes review
may not be instituted if the petition requesting the proceeding is filed more than
1 year after the date [on which the complaint is served].”).
218. See Yissum’s Opening Brief supra note 216, at 33 (citing Thomas
Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 515 (1994)) (“[A]n agency’s
interpretation of a statute or regulation that conflicts with a prior interpretation
is entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency view.”).
219. See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 19–20 (stating that the USPTO
had acted to ensure that its pronouncements remained consistent on the issue of
late joinder of arguments).
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decision in Target Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp.220, 221
Recognizing the inconsistency, the agency leadership granted
rehearing and expanded the panel to reach the opposite, correct
outcome.222 By this account, even if panel stacking is problematic
on its own terms, it seems to be an effective vehicle for ensuring
uniformity in implementing the policy preferences of the
Director.223 To that extent, at least, the agency might have
spoken consistently enough for the Chevron deference that it
sought.
One problem with this account is that it requires a party
request for rehearing.224 As the Patent Office conceded in its
briefing for Yissum, the PTAB did deny late joinder in another
case as being statutorily impermissible—and that case remained
uncorrected.225 The petitioner in that proceeding declined to seek
rehearing, apparently denying the PTAB “the same opportunity
to ensure consistency.”226 If true, it is certainly questionable for
an agency decision’s precedential force to be held hostage to
litigant strategy in this manner.
An even more fundamental problem with the Patent Office’s
account of consistency through panel stacking is that the agency
did it multiple times in the Target case. The original PTAB panel
consisted, as usual, of three judges.227 As the deadline for decision
220. No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014).
221. See Decision Denying Motion for Joinder at 11, Target Corp., No.
IPR2014-00508 (stating that the joinder statute “bars institution of an inter
partes review based on a petition filed more than 1 year after the date on which
the petitioner is served with a complaint alleging infringement of the patent”).
222. See Decision Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing at 1, Target
Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015) (expanding the panel to
seven administrative patent judges).
223. See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 20 (concluding that “[t]he
USPTO thus has acted to ensure that its pronouncements remain consistent on
this issue”).
224. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d) (2019) (conferring the power to seek rehearing
upon a “party dissatisfied with a decision”).
225. See Brief for USPTO, supra note 211, at 20 n.4 (noting that the Board
held in Skyhawke Techs., LLC v. L&H Concepts, LLC, No. IPR2014-01485
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 20, 2015) that “§ 315(c) does not permit joinder of additional
grounds by the same party”).
226. Id.
227. See Order on the Conduct of the Proceedings at 1, Target Corp., No.
IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 24, 2014) (limiting the panel to three
administrative patent judges).
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drew near, however, the PTAB on its own initiative expanded the
panel to five judges, and it was this panel who issued the
supposedly aberrant decision to deny joinder.228 The PTAB’s
internal procedures for panel stacking do permit this sort of sua
sponte expansion.229 The panel, in fact, need not await a request
for rehearing—the internal request may come even in advance of
a decision by the current panel.230
Thus, the only way for the expanded five-judge panel in
Target to have denied joinder as being impermissible was that all
three judges originally on the panel were planning to rule in this
way. Indeed, this is just what happened.231 The agency added two
judges to the panel, hoping to sway one of the original three and
thus produce a 3–2 decision allowing joinder. None of the three
judges were swayed, however, and the result was a 3–2 decision
denying joinder and frustrating the agency’s first, preemptive
attempt at panel stacking.232 Only upon rehearing did the agency
leadership add yet another two judges to the panel so that a 4–3
decision allowing joinder could be assured.233 Even then, the
three judges on the original panel, now outnumbered, issued a
dissent adhering to their original position234 just as they
dissented from the re-stacked panel’s order granting rehearing at

228. See Decision Denying Motion for Joinder, Target Corp., No.
IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014) (denying petitioner’s motion for
joinder).
229. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 1 (REV. 14) ASSIGNMENT OF JUDGES TO
MERITS PANELS, INTERLOCUTORY PANELS, AND EXPANDED PANELS § III(C),
https://perma.cc/9M96-UXZ9 (PDF) (“A judge, a merits panel, or an
interlocutory panel may suggest . . . the need for the designation of an expanded
panel.”).
230. Id. § III(A)(3).
231. See Decision Denying Motion Joinder, Target Corp., No. IPR2014-00508
(P.T.A.B. Sept. 25, 2014) (in which the three judges from the original panel,
Bisk, Fitzpatrick, and Weatherly, joined in the majority).
232. See id. (denying joinder despite the dissent of Administrative Judges
Green and Giannetti).
233. See Decision Motion for Joinder, Target Corp., No. IPR2014-00508
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 12, 2015) (listing a decision by Administrative Judges Tierney,
Green, Change, Giannetti, Bisk, Fitzpatrick, and Weatherly).
234. See id. at 7 (“Section 315(c) does not authorize joinder of proceedings.”).

1712

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019)

all.235 This, too, calls into question the agency’s claim that it has
spoken with the force of law and consistently enough for Chevron
deference.
This approach by the agency achieves its preferred results
not through clear, foreordained legal criteria—nor even through
clear, foreordained designations of which preferred precedents
are to be followed—but simply through incrementalistic political
fiat. It reflects a view on the part of the Patent Office that
deciding cases in an opaque manner is preferable to deciding
them in a transparently political one even where the decisions
themselves may have been politically defensible. This sort of sub
rosa decision-making in the guise of adjudication is not only
problematic, but also unnecessary. Other mechanisms already
exist for singling out desirable cases for their precedential value
and for offering reasoned explanations that are backed by the
prevailing policy of the executive.236
2. Autonomy from the Courts Without Chevron
Patent Office aggrandizement also had a second, more subtle
effect for a time, though the agency has suffered some recent
retrenchment. That effect is greater autonomy from judicial
scrutiny outside the framework of Chevron or other forms of
deference. The nonappealability of threshold decisions whether to
institute PTAB review was undoubtedly a legislative choice
aimed at shielding initial agency screening choices from
disruptive judicial scrutiny prior to a final judgment.237 The
235. See Decision—Granting Petitioner’s Request for Rehearing, Target
Corp. v. Destination Maternity Corp., No. IPR2014-00508 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 12,
2015)
We would deny rehearing because 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) does not provide
for the relief requested by Petitioner and because its Petition is
barred by 35 U.S.C. § 315(b). Additionally, we would deny rehearing
because Petitioner has not identified any matter it believes the
Decision Denying Joinder misapprehended or overlooked, or how that
matter was previously addressed.
236. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 175–76 (2008)
(describing the process of “reasoning by analogy” in the use of precedent).
237. See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1090–91 (“[T]his
border represents the intention of Congress to allocate power differently
between the courts and the Patent Office, but not to divest either institution
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expansion of that nonappealability beyond initial screening,
however, undermines the border that Congress put in place
between the Patent Office and the Article III courts, and
arrogates further power from the courts to the agency.
Expansionary influences like this are especially powerful
early in a new legal regime, and often create substantial
path-dependence.238 By the agency’s good luck, the initial years of
PTAB adjudication under the AIA saw Patent Office arguments
largely succeed. The first Federal Circuit case to construe the
agency’s nonappealable screening power was St. Jude Medical v.
Volcano Corp.,239 in which the panel held that the PTAB’s denial
of a petition was not appealable.240 On the very same day as the
St. Jude decision, the Federal Circuit also explained that the
screening power was generally beyond even the judicial power of
mandamus to correct, regardless whether the PTAB had granted
review241 or denied review.242 From these premises, it was—at
least analytically—a fairly small step to hold, as the Federal
Circuit panel in Cuozzo did hold, that PTAB decisions to proceed
with review remain nonappealable even after final judgment.243

completely.”).
238. See Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability
and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1309, 1349–50 (1995) (critiquing the stare
decisis effect of privileging the view of the first court to adjudicate an issue over
that of the second); see also Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law:
The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L.
REV. 601, 605 (2001) (“The doctrine of stare decisis thus creates an explicitly
path-dependent process.”).
239. 749 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
240. See id. at 1375 (“We base [the decision] on the structure of the inter
partes review provisions, on the language of section 314(d) within that
structure, and on our jurisdictional statute read in light of those provisions.”).
241. See In re Procter & Gamble Co., 749 F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(concluding that immediate review of a decision to institute an inter partes
review is not available).
242. In re Dominion Dealer Sols., LLC, 749 F.3d 1379, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he relevant statutory provisions make clear that we may not hear an appeal
from the Director’s decision not to institute an inter partes review.”).
243. See In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., 793 F.3d 1268, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2015)
(discussing St. Jude Med., Cardiology Div., Inc. v. Volcano Corp., 749 F.3d 1373,
1375–76).
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In a similar turn, the first Federal Circuit case to address
whether the one-year time bar of inter partes review is judicially
reviewable was Achates Reference Publishing v. Apple.244 The
panel in that case held that the PTAB’s determinations regarding
the one-year time bar were part of the exercise of its screening
power and so were nonappealable.245 As a result, the Federal
Circuit, in a series of cases that followed, affirmed all of the
agency’s applications of the time bar.246 This was not because the
agency was regularly correct, but because until the en banc
reversal in Wi-Fi One, the Federal Circuit was bound not even to
consider the issue.247
The resulting autonomy for the Patent Office to act without
any judicial check on its practices has been substantial.
Importantly, this argument about agency autonomy from the
courts is distinct from John Golden’s recent suggestion that the
Patent Office can meaningfully compete with Article III courts,
including the Federal Circuit, without Chevron deference by
acting instead through the agency’s position as first mover on a
range of patent law and policy questions.248 Whereas Golden
244. See 803 F.3d 652, 658 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“We thus hold that 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(d) prohibits this court from reviewing the Board’s determination to
initiate IPR proceedings based on its assessment of the time-bar.”).
245. See id. at 653 (“Because the Board’s determinations to institute IPRs in
this case are final and nonappealable under 35 U.S.C. § 314(d), this court lacks
jurisdiction and dismisses the appeals.”).
246. See, e.g., Click-to-Call Techs., LP v. Oracle Corp., 622 F. App’x. 907,
907 – 08 (Fed. Cir. 2015), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 2508 (2016) (dismissing the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction based on the reasoning in Achates Reference Publishing);
MCM Portfolio, L.L.C. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 812 F.3d 1284, 1288–89 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (“The law is clear that there is ‘no appeal’ from the decision to
institute inter partes review. . . . Achates controls here.”); Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2016), overruled by Aqua
Products, Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“This issue is not
appealable pursuant to § 314(d).”); Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel
Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“[B]ased on Achates, we lack
jurisdiction to review this aspect of the Board’s decision.”); Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v.
Broadcom Corp., 837 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2016), vacated, 878 F.3d 1364,
1374–75 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (upholding the Achates decision).
247. Wi-Fi One, L.L.C. v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (“We therefore hold that the time-bar determinations under 315(b) are
appealable, overrule Achates’s contrary conclusion, and remand these cases to
the panel for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.”).
248. See Golden, supra note 203, 1691–98 (“[D]espite such constraints, the
PTO can still accomplish much through adjudicatory processes as patent law’s
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argues that the Patent Office can influence patent law by acting
first and framing issues for judicial development,249 the argument
developed here is that the Patent Office seeks to broaden its
influence by reducing judicial oversight that would otherwise
operate upon it. Thus, far from steering the court-agency dialogue
in directions that the Patent Office might want, the agency’s push
to interpret the PTAB nonappealability statute increasingly
broadly is better understood as cutting off more and more of the
dialogue altogether.
B. Resulting Systemic Harms
Where the Patent Office has benefited from this sustained
pattern of aggrandizement, however, the patent system has
suffered several notable harms. The particular details of panel
stacking have done injury to due process, and the result-oriented
posture of injecting political judgments into patent validity has
likewise done injury to the property interests that inhere in
patent rights. Meanwhile, both panel stacking and the evading of
judicial review have undermined the agency’s ability to make
credible commitments. Finally, the Federal Circuit’s initial
acceptance of agency arguments about nonappealability has
weakened the long-term prospect of oversight upon the agency’s
future behavior.
1. Injury to Due Process
As multiple judges of the Federal Circuit have suggested,
panel stacking by the Patent Office presents a significant injury
to due process in the form of “fundamental rule of law questions”
such as “predictability and uniformity and transparency of
judgments and neutrality of decision makers.”250 Given the
probable ‘prime mover’—the government body that is likely to be the first to
address many patent law issues in a centralized and systematic fashion.”).
249. See id. at 1694 (“[I]n part through the issuance of guidance documents
that do not have the force of law, the PTO has already shown a capacity to
influence the substantive course of patent law’s development.”).
250. See supra notes 39–52 and accompanying text (exemplifying threats to
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ascendant power of the Patent Office over the validity of already
issued patents, the scale of this due process injury is
correspondingly high.251 Thus far, the agency has defended the
practice on the basis of a decision that is longstanding, but of
questionable relevance.252 That decision, In re Alappat,253
represents a view of agency power that has possibly been
overcome by intervening changes in the institutional
environment of the Patent Office.254
In Alappat, the Commissioner for Patents, then the head of
the agency, directed the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences to rehear and reverse a case.255 He did so by
reconstituting the panel with enough others, including himself, to
outvote the three-member panel who had made the initial
decision.256 Patent applicant Kuriappan Alappat appealed, and
the Federal Circuit affirmed the Commissioner.257
The facts of Alappat are similar in several respects to the
current state of the agency. The BPAI as a whole is now
reconstituted as the PTAB.258 The political head of the agency is
now the Director rather than the Commissioner for Patents.259
The examiners-in-chief of “competent legal knowledge and
due process).
251. See Golden, supra note 248, at 1670 (discussing some limitations on the
Patent Office’s power “[d]espite the PTO’s increased capacities”).
252. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531–32 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (recognizing
that authority of the Commissioner to designate an expanded panel “to consider
a request for reconsideration of a decision”), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d
943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
253. 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
254. Alappat was abrogated by In re Bilski in 2008. Id. In 2012, Congress
enacted the Leahy–Smith America Invents Act, “the largest patent reform since
1952.” Steven J. Markovich, U.S. Patents and Innovation, COUNCIL FOREIGN
REL. (Dec. 12, 2012), https://perma.cc/C29P-3AG3 (last visited Sept. 16, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
255. See Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1531 (“The Examiner . . . requested
reconsideration of this decision.”).
256. See id. (“The Examiner further requested that such reconsideration be
carried out by an expanded panel.”).
257. Id.
258. See 35 U.S.C. § 6 (2018) (“Any reference in any Federal law, Executive
order, rule, regulation, or delegation of authority, or any document of or
pertaining to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences is deemed to refer
to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”).
259. 35 U.S.C. § 3.
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scientific ability” who staffed the BPAI are now administrative
patent judges who staff the PTAB.260 And just as the political
leadership of the agency were expressly members of the BPAI
with authority vested in the Commissioner to designate BPAI
panels, so now the leadership of the agency are members of the
PTAB with authority vested in the Director to designate PTAB
panels.261
However, when Alappat was decided, the available pool of
examiners-in-chief from which three-member panels were
selected were employees appointed to the competitive service.262
By contrast, administrative patent judges are appointed by the
Secretary of Commerce263 and are “inferior Officers” with
“significant functions” and “substantial powers.”264 This
difference between Alappat’s BPAI and today’s PTAB is directly
relevant to the Director’s supervisory authority over the policy
choices reflected in administrative panel decisions.265
The desire after Alappat to strengthen the political oversight
power of the Patent Office head and to give the agency more
260. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1994) (“The examiners-in-chief shall be
persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability, who shall be
appointed to the competitive service.”), with 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2018) (“The
administrative patent judges shall be persons of competent legal knowledge and
scientific ability.”).
261. Compare 35 U.S.C. § 7(b) (1994) (“The Commissioner, the Deputy
Commissioner, the Assistant Commissioners, and the examiners-in-chief shall
constitute the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.”), with 35 U.S.C. §
6(c) (2018) (“The Director, the Deputy Director, the Commission for Patents, the
Commissioner for Trademarks, and the administrative patent judges shall
constitute the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.”).
262. See 35 U.S.C. § 7(a) (1994) (“The examiners-in-chief shall be persons of
competent legal knowledge and scientific ability, who shall be appointed to the
competitive service.”).
263. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2018) (“The administrative patent judges shall be
persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability who are appointed
by the Secretary.”).
264. See John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges Unconstitutional?,
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904, 906 (2009) (discussing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S.
868 (1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
265. Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Administrative Power in the Era
of Patent Stare Decisis, 65 DUKE L.J. 1563, 1599 (2016) (“In the AIA,
Congress . . . gave the PTO enhanced authority (to be implemented in the first
instance by the PTAB).”).
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autonomy expressly included the experiment of allowing the
Director to appoint administrative judges.266 That experiment
ultimately failed, and the reason was precisely that the
burgeoning importance of administrative patent judges’ duties
and powers required their appointment by a “Head of
Department” such as the Secretary of Commerce.267
That same importance counsels in favor of decisional
independence for administrative patent judges as well.268 Such
independence need not divest the Director of his obligation and
authority to “provid[e] policy direction and management
supervision” for the agency.269 The current process by which
PTAB panels are reconfigured reasonably invokes as a
justification the need “to secure and maintain uniformity of the
Board’s decisions.”270 For that uniformity to be obtained through
result-oriented selection of additional judges, however, is
problematic.
This problem also came before the Federal Circuit in
Alappat, in the form of a due process challenge.271 Although the
court found the issue untimely and did not address it, certainly
the Commissioner’s desire for an “effective ability to review
decisions” and to “exercise legal and policy control over decisions”
by administrative judges seems reconcilable with due process, as
Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have argued.272 In pursuit of that
266. See infra notes 454–455 and accompanying text.
267. See infra notes 456–458 and accompanying text.
268. See Christopher J. Walker, Constitutional Tensions in Agency
Adjudication, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2679, 2698 (2019) (“Congress did not grant the
Patent Office Director final decision-making authority over PTAB adjudications.
Agency adjudicators on the PTAB are thus more insulated from political control
that their peers at other agencies.”).
269. 35 U.S.C. § 3(a)(2)(A) (2012).
270. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 229, at pt. III(A)(2)
(“Consideration by an expanded panel is necessary to secure and maintain
uniformity of the Board’s decisions, such as where different panels of the Board
render conflicting decisions on issues of statutory interpretation or rule
interpretation, or a substantial difference of opinion among judges exists on
issues of statutory interpretation.”).
271. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1536 (1994) (“Amicus Curiae FCBA
suggests that the Commissioner’s redesignation practices in this case violated
Alappat’s due process rights.”).
272. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 190, at 1586–87 (expressing skepticism
that the remaking of panels to accomplish policy objectives poses a due process
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purpose, however, the means properly available to the Director
are not unbounded.273
For example, the Supreme Court has previously explained
that “[a]s a member of the Board and the official responsible for
selecting the membership of its panels, . . . the Commissioner
may be appropriately considered as bound by Board
determinations.”274 Moreover, the power to rehear and
re-adjudicate panel decisions carries with it an obligation to
consider evidence and argument, for “[t]he one who decides must
hear.”275 Thus, for members of the PTAB to be placed on a
rehearing panel with foreknowledge that they “will come out the
other way”276 improperly puts the decision ahead of the
consideration of evidence and argument.
Meanwhile, another mechanism is already available to the
Director for ensuring uniformity among PTAB decisions. Indeed,
it is one that comports more fully with the nature of the PTAB as
a quasi-judicial body with adjudicatory authority independent
from the authority of the Director.277 That mechanism is the
curation and designation of PTAB opinions as precedential,
informative, or representative.278 By default, all panel opinions
concern).
273. See Duffy, supra note 264, at 911 (“[T]he PTO Director’s primary
duty—to ‘provid[e] policy direction and management supervision for the
[PTO]’—is subject to the oversight of the Secretary of Commerce.” (quoting 35
U.S.C. § 1(a) (2006)) (alterations in original)).
274. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 523 n.6 (1966).
275. See Duffy, supra note 264, at 908 (citing Morgan v. United States, 298
U.S. 468, 481 (1936)) (explaining why evidence is crucial for administrative
adjudication).
276. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (examination of Patent Office
regarding panel stacking).
277. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Quigg, 932 F.2d 920, 928–29 (Fed. Cir.
1991) (“[T]he Board’s authority to decide the section 101 issue rests on an
independent grant in section 7(b), which requires the Board to decide patent
validity issues when properly raised in Board proceedings, and is independent
from the Commissioner’s authority to establish regulations.”).
278. See generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2 (REV. 9) PUBLICATION OF
OPINIONS AND DESIGNATION OF OPINIONS AS PRECEDENTIAL, INFORMATIVE,
REPRESENTATIVE, AND ROUTINE, https://perma.cc/5ABH-JXLV (PDF) (explaining
procedures for designating cases as precedential, informative, representative, or
routine). The description that follows draws heavily from Saurabh
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are routine unless further action is taken.279 Representative
opinions describe and curate routine opinions to give
practitioners and the public a concise view of the case law on a
certain issue.280 Informative opinions synthesize this descriptive
survey into normative guidance for practitioners and the public to
follow.281 Precedential opinions go the furthest and make the
synthesis binding upon the PTAB itself.282
However, over the first six years of the PTAB’s operations,
the agency designated as precedential only ten opinions from the
administrative trials conducted under the AIA.283 And in the
main, these opinions pertain to the procedural structure of inter
partes and covered business method reviews rather than to issues
of substantive patent law. For the agency “to engage in casespecific readjudication”284 via panel stacking, especially when it
has the power to promote decisional uniformity in a prospective
fashion by designating precedential opinions on which stare
decisis can operate, represents significant injury to due process,
all the more because the injury is unnecessary to inflict.

Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and Appeal Board,
PATENTLYO (May 10, 2016), https://perma.cc/3KCX-BLUW (last visited Sept. 2,
2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
279. See Vishnubhakat, Precedent and Process in the Patent Trial and
Appeal Board, supra note 278 (“[A]ll opinions are routine by default, and some
further action is necessary to elevate an opinion’s status.”).
280. See id. (“Representative opinions offer a sample of typical decisional
outcomes on a given matter.”).
281. See id. (“Informative opinions articulate the PTAB’s norms on recurring
issues and offer guidance both on issues of first impression and on PTAB rules
and practices.”).
282. See id. (“The most difficult to designate and so the rarest
are precedential opinions, which are binding in all future cases before the PTAB
unless and until they are superseded by later binding authority.”).
283. Patent Trial and Appeal Board, Precedential and Informative Decisions,
Issues Specific to AIA Trial Proceedings, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://perma.cc/2J8Z-QZ25 (last visited Sept. 2, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
284. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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2. Injury to Stable Patent Property Rights
The prevailing view of patents as property rights suggests
that stability and certainty in those rights is of chief concern.285
The current practices of Patent Office aggrandizement have
compounded existing difficulties in the patent system’s ongoing
struggle to provide stable rights.286 The existing difficulties are
well understood and need not be repeated here beyond a brief
summary.287 However, the additional injuries to stable property
rights in patents, both directly from panel stacking and indirectly
from overbroad nonappealability, are different in kind and newer
in the patent system’s experience.288
Some of the more persistent challenges to the stability and
certainty of patent property rights fall under four general
headings. One is the tension in defining patent law principles in
terms of predictable rules or flexible standards, a tension that is
well-known across the law.289 The continually shifting and even
disruptive nature of invention makes rules difficult to craft and
285. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 610 (2009) (“Patents convey property
rights, and a substantial degree of certainty is usually thought to be helpful, or
even essential to well functioning property rights.”); see also Alan C. Marco &
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Certain Patents, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 106 (2013)
(explaining that uncertainty disincentivizes patents).
286. See Duffy, supra note 285, at 612 (“Thus, the Federal Circuit and its
predecessor court have changed the rules governing patentable subject matter
no less than three times in thirty years.”).
287. See, e.g., id. at 612–13 (quoting AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications,
Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (explaining the short-lived
reassurance of clear patent adjudication standards “in light of the refocusing of
the § 101 issue that Alappat and State Street have provided”).
288. See Christopher J. Walker & Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of
Adjudication, 107 CAL. L. REV. 141, 159–60 (2019) (describing the new Patent
Office rules under the AIA regarding nonappealability and the Director’s
influence on PTAB outcomes).
289. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV.
953, 957 (1995) (“In every area of regulation . . . it is necessary to choose
between general rules and case-by-case decisions.”); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 616–17 (1992) (discussing
how rules and standards change over time); Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974)
(discussing “the conditions under which greater specificity or greater generality
is the efficient choice”).
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unlikely to survive in the long run.290 By contrast, standards may
be more durable but none the clearer for that, as it is their very
flexibility and openness to facts—especially technological facts in
the context of patent law—that were not anticipated and
planned-for that makes the outcomes of standards uncertain and
unpredictable.291 Recent years have provided many examples of
this tension in patent law, arising from the Supreme Court’s
repeated dissolution of the Federal Circuit’s bright-line doctrinal
rules.292
A second existing challenge to stable patent property rights
is the lack of durability in important principles of patent law,
even when they do take the form of fairly clear rules. As John
Duffy has observed, “clarity without durability has limited value
for a system in which long term investment in tomorrow’s
innovations is supposed to be fostered through property rights
lasting for two decades.”293 For example, the doctrine of
patent-eligible subject matter suffered this very fate repeatedly in
the last forty years, with bright-rule Federal Circuit rules
thwarted either by newer attempts at the same or by Supreme
Court interventions to impose standards instead.294
A third is the problem of notice, especially about the
boundaries of the patent right. Claimants to knowledge resources
such as invention may often have incentives to frame their claims
vaguely, either because the cost of delineating precisely is high or
because full information is not available yet about where among
290. See Duffy, supra note 285, at 614 (“The unruly process of creative
destruction has the power to undermine today’s legal rules every bit as much as
it renders obsolete today’s industrial products, processes, and institutions.”).
291. See id. (“[A] clear but transient rule may be inferior to a standard that
is less clear and less predictable in application, but more durable.”).
292. See Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 Yale L.J. 2, 42–47
(2010) (“Beginning in the mid-1990s . . . the Supreme Court increasingly
asserted its appellate jurisdiction over the Federal Circuit. . . . The Supreme
Court’s deference to Federal Circuit jurisprudence . . . appears to have ended.”);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal
Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 789, 797–800 (2008)
(describing the relationship between the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit).
293. Duffy, supra note 285, at 614–15.
294. See id. at 612–13, 623 (summarizing both the variety and evolution of
Federal Circuit rules and Supreme Court standards of patent-eligible subject
matter).
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resource claims the greatest value might lie.295 The increasingly
contested placement of patent law within property theory adds
more difficulty, as property-based approaches to patent law are
often viewed as a mere proxy for stronger substantive rights for
patent owners, though in fact, property-based approaches can
impose greater obligations on patent owners as well.296
Meanwhile, even within the patent-property framework, it is
questionable whether the right level of notice that a patent (in its
entirety) should provide is best measured by comparison merely
to fences around land, rather than the correspondingly broad
estate boundary of a real property interest.297
Fourth, and closely related to the problem of notice, is the
problem of comparative institutional competence in evaluating a
given patent right. When the Patent Office examines patent
applications and generates a legal right in the form of a patent,
the agency certainly has greater technological expertise, doctrinal
familiarity, and policy experience than the generalist federal
courts that are most likely to enforce or reevaluate the patent in
the future.298 However, because courts have the last word on
patent validity precisely as a check on agency decision-making,299
295. See Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 13–14 (2013) (internal quotations omitted)
(describing potential motivators and benefits for a claimant to frame his or her
claims vaguely).
296. See Deepa Varadarajan, Of Fences and Definite Patent Boundaries, 18
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 563, 594–95 (2016) (“Property-talk has helped expand
the rights of patent holders, but it can also support erecting hurdles meant to
improve the notice function of claims.”).
297. See Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV.
1687, 1697–98 (2013) (cautioning against mistaken conceptual comparisons
within the patent-property framework as the term property right encompasses a
variety of legal rights).
298. See David L. Schwartz, Courting Specialization: An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Comparing Patent Litigation Before Federal District Courts
and the International Trade Commission, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1699, 1701
(2009) (“Most district court judges are generalists who never hear enough patent
cases to become experts in that area of law.”).
299. This was, of course, much more the case before the ascendancy of
administrative patent revocation, though the availability of judicial review
remains a key justification for the constitutionality of the administrative
system. See Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Grp., LLC, 138 S.
Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018) (analyzing the constitutionality of inter partes review).
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the value of the patent both as a legal right and as an economic
asset can be quite uncertain when that value is based only on the
actions of the Patent Office.300 Empirical estimates confirm this
intuition, revealing that resolving uncertainty about the patent
qua legal right “is worth as much on average as is the initial
patent right.”301
The recent practices of the Patent Office have only added
more fuel to these existing fires. The nature of panel stacking is
necessarily to depart from the adjudicatory conclusion that a
PTAB panel has already reached after evaluating the evidence
and applying relevant legal principles to the technological facts of
the case.302 It is, as the agency itself has conceded, a “case-specific
readjudication” to vindicate other values that the agency’s
political leadership might find worthwhile.303 This case-by-case
injection of political values into the validity and scope of property
rights is a destabilizing force. Indeed, the more valuable the
patent property right is, the more likely it is to be involved in
litigation304 and, correspondingly, to be challenged in the
PTAB.305 Meanwhile, the agency’s attempts to broaden its
nonappealable discretion push toward making it less and less
accountable to independent judicial checks on its power.
Of course, not every such case-by-case judgment involving a
property interest will necessarily cut against the property owner.
A specific Patent Office administration may instead be quite
300. See Marco & Vishnubhakat, supra note 285, at 104, 132 (discussing the
effect of uncertainty about patent validity upon the value of patents).
301. Id. at 104.
302. See John M. Golden, PTO Panel Stacking: Unblessed by the Federal
Circuit and Likely Unlawful, 104 IOWA L. REV. 2447, 2449 (2019) (“[The] PTO
Director and Director’s delegee, the Chief Judge of the PTAB, have sometimes
sought to reverse disfavored PTAB judgments by convening expanded panels of
PTAB judges personally selected by the Director of Chief Judge to consider a
request for rehearing—a practice commonly known as ‘panel stacking.’”).
303. See Oral Argument at 47:20, supra note 39 (capturing testimony in
which the Patent Office admits to panel stacking in order to push the Director’s
policy agenda).
304. See generally John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435
(2004) (examining what makes a patent valuable and how to identify valuable
patents).
305. Cf. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for
Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984) (analyzing the relationship between
litigated disputes and disputes settled before or during litigation).
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protective of patent rights. If confronted with a PTAB panel
judgment that invalidates some or all of a patent right, such an
administration might see fit to stack the panel and preserve the
property interest against cancellation. Even individual victories
like this for the patent owner, however, are no less destabilizing
to the patent right itself. These judgments, too, rest just as
strongly on the problematic premise that the patent is not a legal
right to be adjudicated in accordance with stable principles of
neutral and general applicability—but instead is subject to the
political priorities of agency decision-makers.306
In all, the politically inflected treatment of patents poses
significant concerns about due process and other constitutional
protections for property interests.307 It also compounds the
problem of durability with which patent law already struggles, so
that not only are doctrines of patent law flimsy and potentially
fleeting but so also is the integrity of individual patent rights.308
306. This premise is problematic not only from the perspective of legal
theory, but also economic theory insofar as economic actors will rationally avoid
both dealing with an untrustworthy government and dealing with each other
where the benefits of their productive exchanges may be expropriated. See
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Self-Regulation, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 859, 871 (2009)
Because government has a monopoly on the exercise of coercive
powers, it has the authority . . . to take private assets . . . ignoring
property and contracts rights in the process. But without stable
property and contract rights, those with resources will not want to
engage in financial dealings with the government . . . .
see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY,
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS 1–77 (2000) (discussing constraint theory
and why an individual may choose to engage in self-binding); Douglass C. North
& Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J.
ECON. HIST. 803, 803 (1989) (“The more likely it is that the sovereign will alter
property rights for his or her own benefit, the lower the expected return from
investment and the lower in turn the incentive to invest.”).
307. See Adam Mossoff, The Use and Abuse of IP at the Birth of the
Administrative State, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2001, 2007–08 (2009) (discussing the
conceptual shift in property theory that “made it possible for the administrative
state to control and restrict various property uses without implicating the
constitutional protections of the Takings or Due Process Clauses.”); see also
Adam Mossoff, Patents as Constitutional Private Property: The Historical
Protection of Patents under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 693–711
(2007) (analyzing the history and intersection of patents, property, and
constitutional private property).
308. See supra notes 293–294 and accompanying text (discussing how the
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In turn, the likely and rational result of destabilization in the
legal integrity of patent property rights is for economic actors to
seek other means for appropriating value from their
investments.309 The main competitor of patent protection would
be trade secrecy, and a turn to trade secrecy would directly
contravene the patent system’s aim of broader and faster
dissemination of knowledge.310
3. Injury to Credible Commitments
The foregoing critique of imposing political valence on patent
rights follows from a property-rights conception of patent law, but
a property-based conception is not necessary to the critique. A
view of patents as a form of regulation or public franchise rather
than as a type of property311 also has much to reject about the
lack of durability in principles of patent law affects stable patent property rights
and limits the value of a system premised on long term investment).
309. See Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S.
Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), https://perma.cc/M7DV-9P4R (PDF) (“In
addition to the prevention of copying [a patent], the most prominent motives for
patenting include the prevention of rivals from patenting related inventions
(i.e., ‘patent blocking’), the use of patents in negotiations and the prevention of
suits.”).
310. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Towards an Integrated
Theory of Intellectual Property, 88 VA. L. REV. 1455, 1494 (2002) (“[P]atent
protection is conditioned on full disclosure; trade secrecy rests on
non-disclosure.”); see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Trade Secrets: How Well
Should We Be Allowed to Hide Them? The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 9
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 11 (1998) (“One way to think of the
secrecy requirement in trade secrets law is as a substitute for the quality
dimension of other laws—the novelty and nonobvious requirements of patent
law, and the authorship and originality requirements of copyright law.”).
311. Much has been written to debate whether patents are, indeed, property
and should be treated accordingly. See, e.g., Varadarajan, supra note 296, at
573 – 75 (citing, inter alia, Eric R. Claeys, On Cowbells in Rock Anthems (and
Property in IP): A Review of Justifying Intellectual Property, 49 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1033, 1035 (2012)) (discussing the conflicting views between “property
skeptics” and “property essentialists” which differ on whether to apply property
terminology and rhetoric to patents); David Fagundes, Property Rhetoric and the
Public Domain, 94 MINN. L. REV. 652, 652–57 (2010) (analyzing the importance
of property rhetoric in the public domain); Frank H. Easterbrook, Intellectual
Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 108, 113 (1990) (stating
the Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1989 assimilated
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particular recent self-aggrandizements of the Patent Office. In
this context, panel stacking and agency discretion that is broadly
unreviewable by the courts undermines the ability of public
institutions, including and especially the Patent Office itself, to
make credible commitments to innovators and investors.312
Adherence to the legal principles of property is an example of
credible commitments.313 However, because property rights,
especially rights in private property, are vindicated primarily in
the courts,314 a departure from property-centric views of patent
law might suggest that a lack of robust judicial review is
commensurately less problematic. As discussed below, there is
reason to doubt this.315 Still, the broader problem of credible
commitments is a distinct implication of the Patent Office’s
recent actions.
The theory of credible commitments may be summarized as
holding that an institution can induce others to behave, and
especially to invest, in desirable ways by voluntarily constraining
intellectual property to other property).
312. The literature on credible commitments derives primarily from new
institutional economics. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985) (applying transaction cost economics to
economic organization, emphasizing behavioral assumptions of bounded
rationality and opportunism); Douglass C. North, Institutions and Credible
Commitment, 149 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 11 (1993) (examining
the evolution of institutional theory while exploring how to develop institutions
that provide credible commitments, enabling more complex contracting). It also
has some counterpart in the political science literature on agency commitments
but is, as Elizabeth Magill points out, concerned with a different set of
questions. See Magill, supra note 306, at 872 n.40 (citing MURRAY HORN, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 7–24 (1995)) (stating political scientists’ primary argument on
agency commitments is the creation of and delegation “to make a credible
commitment to a constituency about the stability of policy in the future”). The
discussion that follows draws primarily from the legal literature that applies
credible commitment theory to the problems of administrative agency action.
313. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 3 (1990) (providing adherence to the legal principles of
property as an example of credible commitments).
314. See Maureen E. Brady, The Damaging’s Clauses, 104 VA. L. REV 341,
409 (describing how inconsistencies in state interpretations of takings and
damaging clauses “have the effect of preserving federal forums for vindicating
federal property rights”).
315. See infra Part III.C (discussing alternatives to judicial review).

1728

76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2019)

its own decisional power.316 In general, the relevance of credible
commitments to executive action affects the President or the
executive branch as a whole, whose actions vis-à-vis the
coordinate branches of government, the public, or the market are
being evaluated.317 In this context, where an executive agency is
concerned, the commitment is that of the President to signal
credibly the agency’s future policy priorities by acting in certain
ways including the appointment of the agency head.318 Indeed, as
an agency itself answers variously to all three branches, it “does
not even fully control its own destiny because those principals can
force the agency to change its commitments.”319
That said, agencies do have some limited abilities to make
credible commitments. According to what Thomas Merrill has
called the Accardi principle, the discretion that an administrative
agency might enjoy can be turned upon itself to bind its own
future action.320 Under Accardi, an agency is obliged to follow its
own duly promulgated regulations, and to act otherwise is
contrary to law.321 Thus, where no relevant regulation exists to
bind the agency’s hand, despite delegated authority for the
agency to create it, one of two explanations is likely. The agency
may value the flexibility of its own power more than it values the
credibility of the commitments it can make to stakeholders. Or, if
316. See Daryl J. Levinson, Foreword: Looking for Power in Public Law, 130
HARV. L. REV. 31, 64–65 (2016) (“Constraints on decisional power can also
generate credible commitments that induce others to behave in desirable ways.
States and governments that can credibly commit to protecting property rights
or repaying debts will benefit from economic investment and the ability to
borrow on favorable terms . . . .”).
317. E.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 865, 865–68 (2007) (discussing the “the dilemma of credibility that
afflicts the well-motivated executive” as both legislators and the public grant the
executive discretion while still harboring distrust of the executive).
318. See id. at 900 (citing Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48
AM. J. POLI. SCI. 413, 418–21 (2004)).
319. Magill, supra note 306, at 872.
320. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Accardi Principle, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
569, 571 (2006) (describing the “[Supreme Court’s] first full-fledged
endorsement of the idea that agencies must follow their own regulations”).
321. See United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266–67
(1954) (determining that the Board of Immigration Appeals is bound to exercise
its own judgement prior to a final review by the Attorney General as dictated by
the agency’s regulation in question).
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the agency does, in fact, value the credibility of its proffered
incentives more, it is simply acting irrationally.
Given the current posture of the Patent Office at the
formative stages of the first robust adversarial system for
administrative patent revocation, these two potential
explanations are especially salient. If the use of panel stacking
represents a deliberately muscular use of the agency’s discretion
(or at least of the discretion that the agency thinks it has), then
the agency has been trading away its already limited ability to
make credible commitments to induce investments in innovation.
If that is not the result the agency wants, then it is not trading
away the commitment mechanism but simply squandering it.
The push for broader unreviewable discretion is fraught with
similar problems. Until 2005, agencies were even more robustly
able to commit credibly to future courses of action.322 If a court
held that a statute that the agency administered is unambiguous,
with an accompanying interpretation of the statute by the court
itself, then the stare decisis effect of that judicial interpretation
would naturally bind the agency.323 Though this outcome would
likely be disagreeable to the agency, it would at least lend
credibility to the agency’s promise to act according to the court’s
interpretation.324 If the agency wanted to seek that credibility
proactively, it could interpret an ambiguous statute reasonably
and secure a judicial holding approving the agency’s
interpretation based on Chevron deference.325 The binding
interpretation would be the agency’s own, but binding it would

322. See Jonathan Masur, Judicial Deference and the Credibility of Agency
Commitments, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1021, 1024 (2007) (discussing how agency
ability to shift policy and revise interpretations of ambiguous statutes with
greater flexibility peaked in 2005).
323. See id. (comparing “if a court determines that a statue is unambiguous,
the agency is entitled to no deference and thus no flexibility” to “if a statute is
ambiguous, a court must afford deference to a valid agency interpretation and
must allow the agency flexibility to adjust its interpretation over time”).
324. See id. (“[S]tare decisis trumps Chevron, in which case a pre-existing
judicial decision would lock a statute’s interpretation in place.”).
325. See id. (summarizing how Chevron entitles an agency interpretation of
an ambiguous statute deference).
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be. The stare decisis effect would be the same, as would the
resulting credibility of the agency’s promise.326
That changed after National Cable & Telecommunications
Association v. Brand X Internet Services,327 in which the Supreme
Court held that “[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron
deference only if the prior court decision holds that its
construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute
and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”328 In other words,
judicial findings about the meaning of ambiguous statutes could
no longer enjoy stare decisis effect, and an agency could no longer
rely on judicial entrenchment to make its own commitments
credible.329
In light of this change, the sustained litigation agenda by the
Patent Office to make its discretion in PTAB cases increasingly
unreviewable is even more baffling. As with panel stacking, the
relevant trade-off at hand is whether the agency values the
flexibility of its discretion more than the credibility of its
commitment to induce innovation through the incentive of stable,
durable patent rights.330 Such an agenda might have been
conceivable prior to Brand X as a matter of longer-term agency
policy, especially if the agency had not yet rendered a
Chevron-worthy interpretation. On that view, the agency today
could exercise flexible discretion, and the option to seek Chevron
deference tomorrow would remain.331 However, after Brand X,
pushing to expand unreviewable discretion only aggravates the

326. See id. (describing how stare decisis and Chevron deference both have
precedential value).
327. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
328. Id. at 982.
329. See Masur, supra note 322, at 1036–37 (discussing the interaction
between Chevron and precedent after the Supreme Court’s decision in Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs.).
330. See id. at 1024 (“[A]n agency will have difficulty convincing regulated
parties to invest resources or take other actions that may well be critical to the
success of a regulatory initiative when it cannot assure the private actor that
the agency rule—upon which these investments depend—will remain in
place . . . .”).
331. See id. at 1032 (citing Chevron itself that in such cases, courts “must
allow the agency the flexibility to adjust its interpretation over time”).
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Patent Office’s inability to look to judicial entrenchment as a
source of credibility to back the agency’s own assurances.332
The sum of these effects is, ironically, that the recent
power-seeking acts of the Patent Office have the net effect of
undermining the agency’s power of persuasion to induce
investments.333 Ultimately, it is this ability to make credible
commitments that is at the heart of the agency’s importance to
innovation policy. To risk losing it is short-sighted and has the
potential to inflict lasting harm on private decisions about
resource allocation.
4. Injury to Future Oversight
Finally, beyond the present and potentially lasting harms
that these Patent Office policies are likely to bring about within
the tolerance of the agency’s current judicial authorities, the
future supervisory power of the courts is also at stake. The push
for greater judicial unreviewability carves out an autonomous
space for the PTAB to act without judicial scrutiny today,334 but it
also forestalls correction by judicial powers to come.
This is significant because the early precedents in which the
Federal Circuit endorsed the agency’s burgeoning view of
nonappealability could easily have gone the other way, providing
for judicial review instead and frustrating the agency’s attempts.
By choosing not to do so, the Federal Circuit created a slippery
slope where none existed, nor needed to.
The best indication of this counterfactual possibility is that,
on a closely related statute, the precedents did go the other way.
In Versata Development Group, Inc. v. SAP America, Inc.,335
decided over a year after St. Jude and its companion cases and,
332. See John M. Golden, supra note 302, at 2448 (assessing how in light of
recent Supreme Court rejections of challenges to the constitutionality of
proceedings reviewing the validity of issued patent claims, the Patent and
Trademark Office will likely continue to be the leading trial forum for such
proceedings).
333. See supra note 306 and accompanying text (summarizing how stability
in patent property rights and incentives to invest are inversely related).
334. See supra Part III.A.2.
335. 793 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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coincidentally, only a day after its panel decision in Cuozzo, the
Federal Circuit held that in petitions for covered business method
review, judicial review can be had over the PTAB’s application of
the definition of “business methods” that are eligible to be
challenged.336 The panel majority in Versata distinguished the
facts of that case from those of Cuozzo,337 but it is also reasonable
to infer that a different panel would reached the opposite
conclusion in Cuozzo. For example, Judge Newman, who joined
the panel majority in Versata, was also on the panel in Cuozzo
and dissented there, arguing essentially the Versata majority
opinion.338
The result, on balance, was a series of Federal Circuit
appeals from the PTAB in which the deemed unavailability of
judicial review suppressed important differences of opinion about
the merits of Patent Office policy and procedure. For example,
Judge Reyna in Shaw Industries joined the panel’s opinion that
the PTAB’s refusal to grant review on a particular ground was
judicially unreviewable under then-governing precedents.339
However, Judge Reyna also wrote separately to voice deep
concern about the agency’s extraordinary claim to autonomy from
judicial oversight.340 In his view, the PTAB had been using that
autonomy improperly, rejecting what it termed “redundant
336. See id. at 1320 (discussing “the general presumption favoring judicial
review” and how nothing in the statute in question precluded judicial review).
337. See id. at 1322 (stating Cuozzo did not address either of the issues the
Court decided in concluding it may review whether the patent at bar is a
covered business method patent).
338. Compare In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1291 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (Newman, J., dissenting) (concluding the “America Invents Act was
enacted to enable the [PTO] to resolve issues, at reduced cost and delay”), with
Versata, 793 F.3d at 1321 (asserting “it is clear from the legislative history of
the AIA that Congress purposely set out to create a relatively simple and
expedited administrative process”).
339. Shaw Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Automated Creel Sys., Inc., 817 F.3d 1293,
1297–98 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing both St. Jude, 749 F.3d at 1376, and Cuozzo,
793 F.3d at 1273) (“We lack jurisdiction, however, to review the Board’s
decisions instituting or denying [inter partes review] . . . This is true regardless
of whether the Board has issued a final written decision.”).
340. See id. at 1302 (Reyna, J., concurring) (“The Board’s improper,
conclusory statements declining to implement inter partes review (“IPR”) of
grounds it found to be “redundant” leave me deeply concerned about the broader
impact that the Redundancy Doctrine may have on the integrity of the patent
system.”).
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grounds” without any explanation for how it was exercising its
screening power.341 Unbound by earlier Federal Circuit
precedents such as St. Jude or Cuozzo, these concerns would
likely have counseled against such broad acceptance of judicial
unreviewability. And, indeed, when the Federal Circuit sat en
banc in Wi-Fi One to reconsider the unreviewability the one-year
time bar, it was Judge Reyna who wrote for the 9–4 majority
reversing Achates and imposing a principled limit on Patent
Office autonomy.342
To some extent, this sort of path-dependence is an ordinary
result of stare decisis and the purpose of generating binding
precedent.343 However, when the jurisprudential issue at stake is
judicial review itself, the stakes are different in kind. Wherever
else the Federal Circuit might bind itself in agency appeals,
particular care is needed on the issue of judicial review. Policing
its own power of oversight is what keeps the Federal Circuit
capable of policing the potential excesses of the Patent Office.
C. Alternatives to Judicial Review
Even when confronted with this account of benefits to the
agency that are of dubious public value and of the grave systemic
harms that are likely to result, one may reasonably ask whether
judicial review is the only cure, or even the best cure. The Patent
Office, after all, sits in the Department of Commerce and answers
through to the Secretary of Commerce and the President.344 It
341. See id. (“[T]he [Patent Trial and Appeal] Board’s only basis for not
instituting the additional grounds was that those grounds are “redundant” of
the instituted grounds, without any reasoned based why or how the denied
grounds are redundant.”).
342. See Wi-Fi One, LLC v. Broadcom Corp., 878 F.3d 1364, 1374 (Fed. Cir.
2018) (en banc) (stating “[e]nforcing statutory limits on an agency’s authority to
act is precisely the type of issue the courts have historically reviewed” and thus,
time-bar determinations are reviewable).
343. See Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and
Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 602–05
(2001) (applying path dependence theory to the law to assess the influence of
history in the United States’ common law system).
344. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2(b)(8) (2012) (stating the Patent and Trademark
Office is within the Department of Commerce, subject to the policy discretion of
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also relies for its funds on the White House Office of Management
and Budget345 and, ultimately, on Congress itself.346 These
political principals exercise considerable influence over the
agency.347 Thus, if the problem is that the agency is behaving in
unduly political ways, an effective means of discipline might be to
turn to these principals.348
However, there are notable problems with these political
alternatives. For one thing, they give up the game on stable
property interests in patent rights349 and, to the same extent, do
little to resolve the due process concerns involved.350 The result is
not only an entrenchment of incumbent political interests that
have access to the public powers that oversee the Patent Office. It
is also, more perniciously, an entrenchment of incumbent
economic interests in the market, incumbency that could be
disrupted in socially valuable ways by new entrants armed with
patents.351 Judicial review, though it also often favors
well-resourced litigants as an empirical matter, does not base its
the Secretary of Commerce, and shall advise the President, through the
Secretary of Commerce, on intellectual property issues).
345. See id. § 3(a)(2)(B) (requiring the Director to consult with the Patent
and Trademark Public Advisory Committees, respectively and applicably, before
submitting budget proposals to the Office of Management and Budget).
346. See id. § 42(e) (requiring the Secretary of Commerce to submit the
Patent and Trademark Office’s fiscal reports and proposed budget to Congress).
347. See Giulio Napolitano, Conflicts and Strategies in Administrative Law,
12 INT’L J. OF CONST. L. 357, 360 (2014) (discussing Congress’ structural and
procedural control over agencies in order to channel and monitor future
bureaucratic action).
348. See id. (“‘Stacking the deck’ in favor of certain groups, removing some
decisions from the choice set, requiring or forbidding an agency to consider
certain issues, and placing the burden of proof on an agency . . . are among the
most preferred devices [of congressional control].”).
349. See supra Part III.B.2.
350. See supra Part III.B.1.
351. See Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy,
21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 895, 900 (2014) (“Patents allow start-ups to appropriate
the value of their [research and development] results by giving them legally
enforceable exclusive rights that can be exercised against large incumbents
seeking to copy the start-ups’ innovations.”); Stephen H. Haber, F. Scott Kieff &
Troy A. Paredes, On the Importance to Economic Success of Property Rights in
Finance and Innovation, 26 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 215, 222 (2008) (“[P]atents are
powerful antimonopoly weapons—the vital slingshots “Davids” use to take on
“Goliaths.”).
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substantive judgments about the correctness of a position on the
political or economic status of the litigant.352
Another difficulty is that these alternatives for correcting
undesirable Patent Office action risk the appearance of injecting
politics into an apolitical process. Although panel stacking in the
PTAB and the arguments for broader unreviewability of the
PTAB advance priorities that are unrelated to the PTAB’s
adjudicatory mandate, these agency actions have nevertheless
been carried out under the guise of, and through the apparatus
of, adjudication.353 Overt political means of agency discipline such
as a mandate from a higher executive power or budgetary
leverage from Congress would likely be received as an escalation
by the Patent Office and, although it might resolve the immediate
grievance in the PTAB, would be unlikely to change the agency’s
long-term behavior with respect to the underlying structural
problems discussed here.
Finally, perhaps the most pedestrian and formally legal
reason against abjuring judicial review is also the most
fundamental: it has been central to justifying the PTAB’s very
existence. The Supreme Court concluded recently in Oil States
Energy Services, LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC354 that the
system of inter partes review that Congress established in the
AIA is, indeed, constitutional.355 Among the key attributes of
PTAB review to which the Court pointed in emphasizing “the
narrowness of [its] holding” was that “the Patent Act provides for
judicial review by the Federal Circuit.”356 As a result, the Court
expressly avoided the question “whether inter partes review
would be constitutional without any sort of intervention by a
352. See Albert Yoon, The Importance of Litigant Wealth, 59 DEPAUL UNIV.
L. REV 649, 649–52 (2010) (discussing the relationship between litigant wealth
and litigation outcomes while addressing the neutral role the court must play).
353. See John M. Golden, supra note 302, at 2464 (“[PTO] panel stacking is a
reasonable way for the PTO Director to oversee [PTAB] adjudication where
Congress has failed to give the Director a more conventional mechanism for
doing so . . . .”).
354. 138 S. Ct. 1365 (2018).
355. Id. at 1379 (affirming the Court of Appeals’ reasoning that inter partes
review does not violate Article III or the Seventh Amendment).
356. See id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 319 (2012)) (“[T]he Patent Act provides for
judicial review by the Federal Circuit . . . .”).
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court at any stage of the proceedings.”357 In short, judicial review
was a significant element of the set of sufficient conditions that
underlay the constitutional legitimacy of PTAB review as
currently structured. The erosion of that review by the Patent
Office itself, therefore, stands to erode the very foundation on
which the agency’s system of administrative patent revocation
rests.
IV. Sources of Agency Aggrandizement
Part III discussed the benefits that have motivated the
Patent Office in the aggrandizements detailed in Part II, the
resulting systemic harms, and the continuing superiority of
judicial review over other means for ensuring agency discipline.
This Part reveals the origin story, explaining why the Patent
Office colorably thought itself empowered to act as it has. That
exercising the patent validity power ex post was once almost
exclusively the province of the courts, but is now increasingly and
conspicuously the province of the Patent Office, is well
documented.358
However, as Part IV.A explains, the reasoning behind this
reallocation has traditionally been an account of greater
expertise, lower cost, and more accurate outcomes in the
specialized agency setting than the courts would have offered. To
that traditional account Part IV.B adds a largely neglected
rationale: a desire for greater political input in the patent system.
Part IV.C then takes that generalized desire for political input,
which Congress itself shared and implemented in certain discrete
domains, and delves into the actual decisional structure of the
357. See id. (citing Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 445 (1977)) (“[W]e need not consider whether
inter partes review would be constitutional ‘without any sort of intervention by
a court at any stage of the proceedings.’”).
358. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 78–81 (discussing how
the Patent Office assesses and decides invalidity petitions while the federal
courts manage patent infringement litigation which the aforementioned
petitions impact); see also Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding, supra note 118,
at 345–47 (addressing ex post review up to the America Invents Act); Mark D.
Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative Revocation
System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 3–7 (1997) (discussing the
role of the Patent and Trademark Office in American patent law jurisprudence).
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PTAB, showing that the agency has consciously commingled two
separately delegated powers in a bid to obscure its remarkable
claims to power that Congress did not give.
A. The Traditional Account: Expertise
When Congress was considering what would become the first
transfer of the patent validity power from Article III courts to the
Patent Office, the typical posture for reviewing patent validity
had been as a defense in infringement litigation359 or, somewhat
less commonly, as a claim for declaratory judgment that the
patent was invalid.360 The motivations for an administrative
alternative were primarily of institutional competence.361 The
considerable cost and delay of patent litigation, constrained
access from Article III standing requirements, and the accuracy
of the decisions that courts produce were all matters of concern.362
Although the extent and effect of these concerns is undoubtedly
greater today,363 cost and delay were deeply felt even when
Congress was considering enacting ex parte re-examination.364

359. See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) (2018) (providing that “[i]nvalidity of the
patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in part II as a condition for
patentability” shall be a defense to infringement).
360. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (authorizing any court of the United States to
“declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such
declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought”); see also Walker
Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176 (1965)
(noting that “one need not await the filing of a threatened suit by the patentee;
the validity of the patent may be tested under the Declaratory Judgment Act”).
361. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 51–55 (discussing
motivations for administrative rather than judicial review of patent validity).
362. See id. (summarizing the interrelated arguments in favor of
administrative review).
363. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attorney Fee Awards Really
Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 15, 18 (2014) (summarizing the cost of patent
infringement litigation across different tiers of disputed value based on data
from the American Intellectual Property Law Association’s biennial Report of
the Economic Survey).
364. See H.R. Rep. No. 96-1307, pt. I, at 3–4 (1980) (emphasizing the
potential for administrative review to resolve patent validity questions “without
recourse to expensive and lengthy infringement litigation”).
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So was accuracy. Contemporary empirical research suggests
that the federal courts may not be particularly accurate on
questions of patent validity,365 such as the proper interpretation
of terms within patents.366 Longitudinal research also suggests
that judges with experience specific to patent law are less likely
to suffer reversal on appeal and that is true of recent as well as
cumulative patent experience.367 However, though this research
may tend to vindicate historical efforts to transfer power away
from a generalist court toward an expert agency, the
contemporaneous desire in 1980 for more accurate patent case
decisions was different in a subtle, but important way that
reveals much about the power transfer itself.
Rather than imagining the court as a unitary decision maker
that could be beneficially supplanted by an agency decision
maker, makers of patent policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s
were quite sensitive to how the validity power was shared, within
a court, between judges and juries.368 There was robust
disagreement on whether a jury was the right audience for patent
validity issues of both scientific and legal complexity, but the
controversy was not about accuracy as such.369 Judges tended to
agree that in reaching accurate decisions, the best that a jury

365. See generally Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in
Patent Cases, 101 GEO. L.J. 637 (2013) (discussing proposals to improve
accuracy in the resolution of patent disputes).
366. See, e.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical
Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV.
223, 248 – 49 (2008) (identifying rates of reversal due to improperly construed
terms).
367. See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the
Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the
Case for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 443–44
(2011) (discussing empirical research on the effects of judicial experience on
rates of reversal).
368. See, e.g., The Seventh Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 88 F.R.D. 369, 387 (1980) [hereinafter
Seventh CCPA Conf.] (providing personal observations of the Hon. Frank J.
McGarr).
369. See, e.g., The Eighth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 92 F.R.D. 183, 275–77 (1981) [hereinafter
Eighth CCPA Conf.] (preserving on record anecdotes from judges in attendance).
While some judges agreed that juries could follow most cases, others found
certain issues too complex for the average juror to understand.
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could do was as well as a judge,370 and quite often the jury was
likely to make mistakes.371 The source of mistake might have
been that juries are suggestible to clever lawyering, that they
depart from evidence or judicial instruction, or simply that they
lack scientific or legal literacy.372 At all events, these were
utilitarian concerns.
The argument in favor of jury trials in patent cases,
meanwhile, was based on constitutional principle.373 Whatever
the wisdom of jury trials in patent cases, the Seventh
Amendment required it.374 Put another way, the jury right in
patent cases was not welcomed because it produced accuracy; it
was tolerated because it was, higher courts had said,
constitutionally necessary. The real policy debate was about
power.
The agenda to shift power from courts, particularly juries, on
patent validity issues and into the Patent Office had one
particularly persuasive aspect. The problems of cost, delay, and
accuracy insofar as juries were concerned were still relatively
new.375 Only twenty years earlier had the Supreme Court set the
370. For example, of the Hon. William C. Conner suggested in his remarks
with that “the jury is usually right. At least they make the same mistakes as
judges.” Id. at 276.
371. See Seventh CCPA Conf., supra note 368, at 387 (listing remarks by the
Hon. Frank J. McGarr opining that “juries have complicated the patent
litigation situation, and I don’t think they have contributed to the end product
we all seek, which is the doing of justice and the achieving of the right result”).
372. See id. (enumerating the pitfalls encountered by jurors in complex
patent litigation).
373. Judge McGarr, just before his criticism of jury decision-making, stated
the tension plainly:
I would not say . . . that I am hostile to the jury idea in patent cases.
You have to be careful how you say this because the jury right is a
very genuine one, and attorneys should have a right to a jury if the
court says that juries are available in patent cases, and it sounds like
the judge is arrogating unto himself the total power of decision . . . .
Id. at 386.
374. See generally Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 344 (4th Cir. 1971)
(issuing a writ of mandamus directing the district court to allow demands for
jury trials on patent validity as well as infringement because the Seventh
Amendment jury trial right applied to patent cases and was not lost by
combining legal claims for damages with equitable claims for injunctive relief).
375. See infra note 380 and accompanying text (demonstrating that jury
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constitutional premise requiring patent validity to be tried to
juries.376 In Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover,377 the Court held
that where a case presents both legal issues (such as a claim for
damages) and equitable issues (such as a claim for injunction),
the right to have the legal issues tried to a jury cannot be lost by
deciding the equitable issues first in a bench trial.378
Before Beacon Theatres, that loss of jury trial would not only
have been doctrinally ordinary but also empirically rare.379 As
Figure One shows, among patent trials annually, fewer than a
handful were tried to juries in the years preceding Beacon
Theatres.380 Where a jury trial was demanded, judges first tried
equitable claims and then allowed the jury to try whatever legal
claims remained.381 At that point, the loser in equity was, due to
collateral estoppel, unable to reargue the lost issues to the jury,
including the issue of patent validity.382 Once it became clear that
the holding in Beacon Theatres applied to patent cases,383 a case
with a jury demand had to be put to the jury first. The share of
patent cases that were tried to juries began to rise, and although
many a judge tried “to make everything a legal issue he can make

trials were empirically rare, and the associated costs had yet to be realized).
376. See Beacon Theaters, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959)
(designating the trial court’s use of discretion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) to
deprive a party of a full jury trial impermissible).
377. Id.
378. See id. at 501–11 (“[O]nly under the most imperative circumstances . . .
can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through prior determination of
equitable claims.”).
379. See infra note 380 and accompanying text (charting the percentage
increase of patent jury trials).
380. Figure 1, found in the Appendix, is reproduced from J. Jonas Anderson
& Peter S. Menell, Informal Deference: A Historical, Empirical, and Normative
Analysis of Patent Claim Construction, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 20 (2013). I am
grateful to Professors Anderson and Menell for sharing the underlying data that
they compiled from separate sources.
381. See Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents Are Valid?, 99
VA. L. REV. 1673, 1706 (2013) (noting how the common practice of holding jury
trials only after bench trials explained the small number of patent jury trials in
the decades before Beacon Theaters).
382. Id. (citing Ralph W. Launius, Some Aspects of the Right to Trial by Jury
in Patent Cases, 49 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 112, 112–13 (1967)).
383. See Tights, 441 F.2d at 338, 343 (recognizing the right to submit legal
issues to a jury notwithstanding the complexity of patent cases).
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a legal issue to minimize submission to the jury,”384 there was an
appetite to roll back more systematically the larger problem of
juries reviewing technical questions of patent validity.
The resulting system for ex parte reexamination was only the
start. In the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999,385 a new
system for inter partes reexamination offered yet another
alternative for litigants to leave courts and seek review in the
Patent Office.386 The issues of court-agency power that these
first- and second-generation administrative proceedings raised
bear a striking resemblance to the current controversies over
patent validity review under the AIA.387 Foremost among these
were two issues, the substitutability of the Patent Office for
district courts in reevaluating patents and the contours of judicial
review over the Patent Office.388 In order to appreciate these two
issues more fully, however, it is first necessary to identify a less
widely appreciated rationale for transferring ex post power over
patent validity away from courts and into the agency.
B. The Neglected Rationale: Political Input
That rationale is a desire to seek greater political input into
the patent system. On first impression, the notion of imbuing a
system of property rights with political salience is peculiar.
Well-functioning property rights regimes tend to arise from legal
structures that reflect certainty and durability389—rarely the
384. Seventh CCPA Conf., supra note 368, at 385.
385. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113
Stat. 1501.
386. See id. (giving the PTO some authority to conduct inter partes
adjudicatory proceedings).
387. See generally Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in
Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965 (2009) (discussing the evolution of the
PTO’s administrative influence compared to that of the judicial branch).
388. See id. at 1975 (discussing increased judicial deference to the PTO’s
findings); see also Arti K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex
Ante Foundations for Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237, 1239 (2012)
(noting the resemblance of post-grant review proceedings to formal
adjudications).
389. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of
Patentability, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 609, 610–11 (2009) (highlighting the
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stuff of politics. Nevertheless, persistent themes in the patent
literature and across multiple domains of patent policy reveal a
view that patents should be treated as a species of regulation or
monopoly privilege rather than property,390 that patent law
should be regarded as public rather than private law,391 and that
the patent system should be approached essentially as a field of
industrial policy.392 These views are systematically political and
exert considerable pressure against traditional accounts of
patents as private property rights that are best mediated by

necessity of “certainty” to well-functioning property rights; see also Craig Allen
Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts, 74 IND. L.J. 759, 759
(1999) (articulating the benefits of propriety certainty).
390. For scholarship discussing this tension and its effects, see Adam
Mossoff, Exclusion and Exclusive Use in Patent Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321,
370–77 (2009) (analyzing the role of conceptual property theory in patent law);
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L.
REV. 1031, 1035 n.8 (2005) (identifying a dichotomy within intellectual property
theory); Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 253, 304–05 (2003) (discussing whether patents should be considered a
form of monopoly or more akin to the traditional property right of exclusion);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Patents, Property, and Competition Policy, 34 J. CORP. L.
1243, 1243 (2009) (considering whether competition policy should have a more
prominent role in the patent system).
391. See, e.g., Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 41, 43 (2012) (stating that “patent validity challenges are complaints
about government conduct that implicate important public interests and
potentially affect many parties not before the court”); Megan M. La Belle, Public
Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1865, 1866 (2016) (proposing an
enforcement scheme for patent law); Ted Sichelman, Purging Patent Law of
“Private Law” Remedies, 92 TEX. L. REV. 517, 517 (2014) (rejecting the private
remediation of infringement as antithetical to the “overarching aim” of patent
law); Sapna Kumar, Standing Against Bad Patents, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 87,
87 (2017) (discussing use of standing jurisprudence to hinder challenges to bad
patents before the PTAB).
392. See Kenneth W. Dam, The Economic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 247, 248 (1994) (positing that the economic policy behind patent
law can be thought of as industrial policy “because it uses legal intervention to
decide what policies to promote”); see also Michael H. Davis, Patent Politics, 56
S.C. L. REV. 337, 339–40 (2004) (describing patent law as “a kind of disguised
industrial policy”); Oskar Liivak, Maturing Patent Theory from Industrial Policy
to Intellectual Property, 86 TUL. L. REV. 1163, 1165 (2012) (classifying patent law
as industrial policy rather than a theory of property); Allen K. Yu, Within
Subject Matter Eligibility—A Disease and a Cure, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 387, 388
(2011) (emphasizing “the importance of viewing the patent regime not just as a
property system, but as part of a larger regulatory regime for promoting
innovations”).

DISGUISED POLICY PATENT MAKING

1743

market ordering.393 As a result of these pressures, reallocations of
the ex post patent validity power away from courts and into the
Patent Office now also have a clear political valence.394
To understand the politicization of ex post patent validity, it
is helpful first to clarify what it does not represent. For one thing,
it is not merely a more specific recapitulation of post-realist
attitudes about the malleability of property rights more
generally.395 Nor is it a systematic remaking of the Patent Office
into a more formally participatory and deliberative agency—a
“surrogate political process”396 similar to that of the
Environmental Protection Agency—as scholars including James
Boyle397 and Kali Murray398 have advocated.
Instead, the move of ex post patent validity toward a political
sphere has come in a more piecemeal fashion. A direct
mechanism for the change has been the specific way in which the
patent validity power was reallocated away from courts and to
political authorities within the Patent Office.399 Another, more
indirect, has been the emergence of technology- and
industry-specific laws and policies pertaining to patentability and
patent validity. Taken together, these mechanisms have produced
ex post a trend similar to what Arti Rai has described and
393. See Lemley, supra note 390, at 1032 (noting the similarities between
the “Protectionist” regime for intellectual property and traditional private
property theory).
394. See infra notes 399–400 (explaining the politicization of patent validity
decisions).
395. See Arti K. Rai, Competing with the “Patent Court”: A Newly Robust
Ecosystem, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 386, 386–87 (2014) (comparing
historical accounts that liken patents to inviolable tangible property with
modern views); see also Mossoff, supra note 307, at 2013 (discussing the role of
intellectual property theory in redefining property in land).
396. Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1670 (1975).
397. See James Boyle, A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism
for the Net?, 47 DUKE L.J. 87, 87 (1997) (exploring a theoretical “political
economy” of intellectual property) .
398. See Kali N. Murray, Rules for Radicals: A Politics of Patent Law, 14 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 63, 64 (2006) (using environmental law as a comparative model
to conceptualize a world of politically-molded patent law).
399. See Rai, supra note 388, at 1238–39 (identifying the ways in which the
PTO has increased its influence within patent policy).
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advocated with regard to ex ante decision-making by political
actors about patent validity.400
1. Empowering the Agency’s Political Leadership
From the start, administrative exercise of the patent validity
power has been divided. The eventual determination of validity
has been made by an administrative adjudicator. In ex parte and
inter partes reexaminations, that has been the reexaminer.401 In
AIA reviews, it has been a panel of at least three administrative
patent judges.402 Prior to consideration of the merits, however,
petitions for each type of administrative proceeding have always
been screened to ensure that expending resources to reconsider
patent validity would not be a waste.403
In ex parte and inter partes reexamination, the legal
standard for this screening was to identify a “substantial new
question of patentability.”404 Now in inter partes review, covered
business method review, and post-grant review under the AIA,
the standard is a sufficient likelihood that the proceeding will
successfully invalidate at least one claim in the challenged
patent.405 Covered business method and post-grant reviews’
screening criteria can be separately satisfied if “the petition
raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to
400. See id. at 1244 (positing “whether the PTO should be given rulemaking
authority over substantive patent law . . . .”).
401. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE §§ 2253, 2656 (9th ed. 2018) (designating Examiner to
determine validity in ex parte and inter partes reexamination).
402. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b)(4), (c) (2012) (requiring review by a three-member
panel).
403. See infra notes 404–414 (identifying varying levels of screening
requirements).
404. 35 U.S.C. § 303; see U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note
401, at § 2216 (stating the screening standard for ex parte reexamination); 35
U.S.C. § 312; see also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 401, at
§ 2616 (stating the screening standard for inter partes reexamination).
405. The standard for IPR is a “reasonable likelihood” of success. 35 U.S.C.
§ 314(a). Meanwhile, the standard for CBM and PGR is that success is “more
likely than not.” Id. § 324(a); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (subjecting proceedings implemented
pursuant to the transitional program for covered business method patents to the
same standards and procedures of a post grant review).
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other patents or patent applications.”406 Ex parte reexamination,
moreover, does not require a third party to seek review: the
agency may open review of the validity of an issued patent on its
own initiative and at any time.407
In all of these administrative proceedings, the power to carry
out the screening rests with the political head of the agency.408
Since 2000, that has been the Director of the Patent and
Trademark Office, a position that is also styled the Under
Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property.409 Prior to 2001,
the relevant political head was the Commissioner of Patents, and
the ex parte reexamination statute referred to that position
accordingly.410
This repeated investment of the screening power in the
political, rather than adjudicatory, structure of the Patent Office
is significant. The widely recited justification for administrative
adjudication is that the agency has a comparative advantage in
scientific expertise;411 this, in turn, is said to lower costs, expedite
resolutions, and ultimately produce more accurate decisions.412
406. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act § 18(a)(1)
(using the same standards and procedures of post-grant review for covered
business method patents).
407. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (“On his own initiative, and any time, the
Director may determine whether a substantial new question of patentability is
raised . . . .”); 37 C.F.R. § 1.520 (2019) (authorizing ex parte reexamination at
the initiative of the director); see also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
supra note 401, at § 2239 (vesting discretion in the director to order
reexamination even in the absence of a request by the parties).
408. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 314(a), 324(a) (discussing when the director
may authorize review or determine that a substantial new question of
patentability exists).
409. See AIPA, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I § 4713, 113 Stat. 1501 (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 3(a) (2000)) (“The powers and duties of the United
States Patent and Trademark Office shall be vested in an Under Secretary of
Commerce for Intellectual Property and Director of the United States Patent
and Trademark Office . . . .”).
410. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1982) (designating Commissioner to make the
determination whether a substantial new question of patentability is raised).
411. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 53 (quoting 35 U.S.C.
§ 6 (2018)) (“In contrast [to federal judges], administrative patent judges have
long been required to be ‘persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific
ability.’”).
412. See id. at 52–54 (discussing arguments in favor of administrative
review).
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Placing a political filter at the threshold of the process, however,
undermines the presumed procedural neutrality of technical
expertise. This effect is especially stark for ex parte
reexamination, where the political agency head, who already
holds the keys to review, may open the gates on his own initiative
with no need to wait (as federal courts must wait) for private
parties to initiate a case.413 It is questionable whether apolitical
impartiality should be sacrificed in exchange for technical
expertise in this way.
Even if the benefits of such a tradeoff outweighed the costs,
however, it seems clear that judicial review of the agency’s
screening would be needed to ensure that a political head’s
exercise of threshold power was not unduly distorting the
substantive agency adjudications that follow. But this is not the
case, either. The Director’s screening decision has been “final and
nonappealable” in every iteration of administrative validity
review, starting with ex parte reexamination,414 continuing with
inter partes reexamination,415 and now in the AIA proceedings.416
The details of this nonreviewability have changed in important
ways, moreover, from reexamination to the AIA proceedings.417
2.

Making Technology- and Industry-Specific Policy

Although conferring judicially unreviewable power upon
Patent Office leadership to screen requests for patent
reevaluation is the most direct injection of politics into how the
validity power is exercised, it is not the only one. The agency has
also become receptive to ex post political input into patent validity

413. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (explaining the
authorization of ex parte reexamination at the director’s discretion).
414. 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1982); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1988); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c)
(1994); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c)
(2018).
415. 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2000); 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2006); 35 U.S.C. § 314(d)
(2018).
416. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(d), 324(e) (2018) (prohibiting appeal for inter
partes and post-grant review).
417. See infra notes 470–475 and accompanying text (discussing the
presumptive reviewability of subsequent adjudication).
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through indirect interventions in patent law and policy.418 The
common thread in these laws and policies is that they are specific
to certain technologies and industries.419
To be clear, the particular trend of tailoring patent law and
policy by technology and industry, like the politicization of patent
validity more generally, is a broad and complex phenomenon with
a variety of structural implications for the patent system.420 The
enacted law of patents is a set of broad, unitary standards that
are theoretically context-neutral,421 but these standards can
operate quite differently in practice and application across
technologies and industries.422 This much is straightforward,
even self-evident.423 More politically salient, however, is the
argument that law- and policy-makers, primarily courts, should
take conscious account of these disparities and should try to
tailor patent protection to perceived economic goals and
exigencies.424
This argument is even more politically salient when the
institution involved is not the judiciary, but the Patent Office.
The reason to meet technology and industry needs through
418. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89
VA. L. REV. 1575, 1586–87 (2003) [hereinafter Policy Levers] (remarking on
government-created incentives for research and development).
419. See id. at 1587 (“[T]he amount of nonpatent incentives to innovate
varies by industry.”).
420. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law
Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1155–57 (2002) [hereinafter
Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?] (reflecting on the implications of applying
technology- and industry-specific rather than neutral standards).
421. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Expired Patents, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 419,
420–26 (2015) (discussing technology-specificity in patenting); see also NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY 42 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004) (“[The patent system] is a
unitary system with few a priori exclusions.”).
422. See Mark D. Janis, Comment: Equilibrium in a Technology-Specific
Patent System, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 743, 743–44 (2004) (expressing
reservations concerning the feasibility of equilibrium in patent law); see also Is
Patent Law Technology-Specific?, supra note 420, at 1156 (commenting on the
inconsistency of rule application across different industries).
423. See Janis, supra note 422, at 743 n.2 (“Or, to put it more succinctly,
‘duh.’”).
424. See Policy Levers, supra note 418, at 1579 (noting the substantial
latitude courts possess to “[adapt] the patent statute to evolving technologies”).
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judicial tailoring rather than, say, legislative tailoring is that the
legislative process invites rent seeking and fails to adapt quickly
enough to innovation.425 Legislative tailoring also produces
balkanized legal regimes and requires costly litigation to resolve
boundary line-drawing issues between adjacent regimes.426
Tailoring by courts, for all its flaws,427 is likely to be more
responsive and less prone to capture than sector-specific
legislation.428
Thus, reallocating technology- and industry-specific ex post
patent validity judgments out of the courts and into the Patent
Office represents not one, but two political moves. One is the very
act of actively tailoring patent protection in service of economic
policy goals rather than merely recognizing that such effects may
come about naturally in different fact contexts. The other is the
placement of this tailoring with an agency that is itself a target
for efforts at rent seeking and capture.429

425. Id. at 1578.
426. See Janis, supra note 422, at 745 (considering whether numerous
boundary issues would inundate the dockets of even the most skilled patent
judges).
427. See Rai, supra note 388, at 1242–43 (listing the drawbacks of article III
adjudication).
428. See Policy Levers, supra note 418, at 1578–79 (“[C]oncerns about . . . the
inability
of
industry-specific
statutes
to
respond
to
changing
circumstances will lead us to conclude . . . that we should not jettison our
nominally uniform patent system in favor of specific statutes that protect
particular industries.”); see also Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the
Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 57 (2010) (discussing “captureprone administrative rulemaking”).
429. See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 100 (U. of Chi. Press 2009) (“Technology-specific patent
legislation encourages rent-seeking”); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six
Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592 (1999) (explaining that
an indirect cost of issuing invalid patent includes rent-seekers who take
advantage of the relaxed patent standards); Carl Shapiro, Patent System
Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1022–23
(2004) (showing the problems created by patent monopolies and how
competition authorities are addressing them); John R. Thomas, The
Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent
Administration Reform, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 731 (2002) (reasoning that
the USPTO is a target for “rent-seeking entrepreneurs” who want to form patent
acquisition ventures).
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The most direct example of this sector-specific politicization
in ex post exercises of the patent validity power is covered
business method review under the AIA.430 Structurally, CBM
proceedings follow the standards and procedures of post-grant
review.431 In application, meanwhile, CBM reviews allow the
invalidation even of patents issued prior to the AIA, just as inter
partes reviews allow.432 What distinguishes covered business
method review from other AIA proceedings, however, is its
emphasis on a particular industry sector:
[T]he term “covered business method patent” means a patent
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for
performing data processing or other operations used in the
practice, administration, or management of a financial product
or service, except that the term does not include patents for
technological inventions.433

The statute also calls for this definition to be elaborated
through agency regulation.434 The result is still greater political,
rather than adjudicatory, valence to the Patent Office’s ex post
power over patent validity.
C. Commingled Powers in the Patent Office
The agency’s power over patent validity is divided into two
tasks—screening PTAB petitions for apparent merit and
adjudicating selected petitions—and these tasks rest with the
agency’s political leadership and adjudicatory apparatus,
respectively.435 This alone might be cause for concern, as it
430. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 18, 125
Stat. 284, 329–31 (2011) (discussing the transitional program for covered
business method patents).
431. See id. § 18(a)(1) (describing how the transitional program shall employ
the standards and procedures of post-grant review).
432. See id. § 18(a)(2) (explaining how the regulations of this subsection
apply to any covered business method patents issued before the Act).
433. Id. § 18(d)(1) (emphasis added).
434. See id. § 18(d)(2) (clarifying that the Director can issue regulations for
determining whether a patent is for a technological invention).
435. See supra notes 404–410 and accompanying text (listing the screening
criteria for inter partes review, covered business method review, and post-grant
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interposes a political filter at the threshold of an adjudicatory
process traditionally justified in terms of agency expertise.436 For
better or worse, however, this has been the pattern of ex post
patent validity review in the Patent Office from the start.437
What is cause for greater concern is that the screening and
adjudicating functions in modern AIA review are currently
commingled in the same entity within the agency: the PTAB.438
That commingling is likely unauthorized under the law.439 It has
also produced undesirable incentives for the Patent Office to
evade judicial review, incentives that the agency has pursued in
progressively broader, more far-reaching arguments.440
Although the AIA delegates to the Director the power to
screen petitions for inter partes review, covered business method
review, and post-grant review,441 the Director does not personally
exercise this power.442 Instead, the Director has subdelegated this
power to the Patent Trial and Appeal Board.443 The AIA also
delegates to the PTAB the power to adjudicate, and this

review under the AIA).
436. See Strategic Decision Making, supra note 8, at 55–56 (discussing the
reasons to favor administrative review of post-patent proceedings over Article
III review).
437. Both ex parte and inter partes reexamination, for example, placed
initial screening of petitions seeking administrative review within the power of
the Director and, prior to that, the Commissioner for Patents. See 35 U.S.C.
§ 303 (1980) (providing that the Director will determine new questions of
patentability within three months following a request for reexamination); see
also id. § 312 (1999) (listing the requirements for a petition under section 311).
438. See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1078 (stating that
the Director has the authority to sub-delegate screening power to the PTAB and
to conduct the actual review).
439. See id. (claiming that Patent Office adjudication is politically distorted
due to the authority delegated to the politically appointed Director of the Patent
Office to screen requests for review).
440. See supra Parts I.B–I.D (outlining the different approaches taken by
the Patent Office to avoid judicial review).
441. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314(a), 324(a) (2012) (discussing the authority of the
Director in instituting inter partes review and post-grant review).
442. See Porous Court-Agency Border, supra note 114, at 1078
(acknowledging that the Director sub-delegates the screening power to a
three-judge panel in the PTAB).
443. See 37 C.F.R. § 42.4(a) (2012) (“The Board institutes the trial on behalf
of the Director.”).

DISGUISED POLICY PATENT MAKING

1751

delegation is direct.444 In current practice, the panel of three
administrative patent judges who screen a petition for sufficiency
are the same panel who adjudicate the petition if it is accepted for
review.445
However, it is doubtful that the Director has authority to
subdelegate the screening function to the PTAB in this way.446
The ability of the Director to subdelegate his powers extends to
subordinates whom the Director has himself appointed.447 The
Director may “appoint . . . officers, employees (including
attorneys), and agents”448 and may “define the . . . authority . . . of
such officers and employees and delegate to them such of the
powers vested in the Office.”449 These constraints matter because
the Director may not act outside any “specific limitation on [his]
delegation authority.”450
The administrative patent judges of the PTAB are not within
the reach of this delegation authority because the Director does
not appoint judges to the PTAB.451 That power rests with the

444. See 35 U.S.C. § 318(a) (delegating to “the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board” the authority and obligation to issue final written decisions in inter
partes reviews); see also id. § 328(a) (discussing the authority of the “Patent
Trial and Appeal Board” to issue final written decisions in post-grant reviews
and, by extension, covered business method reviews).
445. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1028
(Fed. Cir. 2016) (explaining that the Patent Office “has determined that, in the
interest of efficiency, the decision to institute and the final decision should be
made by the same Board panel”).
446. This argument was advanced by the appellant in Ethicon v. Covidien,
and the discussion here tracks substantially that argument. See Brief for
Intervenor-Director of the USPTO, Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP,
812 F.3d 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (No. 2014-1771), 2015 WL 1523016, at *29
(arguing that the statutory limits prohibit the Director from delegating the
institution decision to the PTAB).
447. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3) (describing the authority of the Director to
appoint officers, employees, and agents and to define their duties).
448. Id. § 3(b)(3)(A).
449. Id. § 3(b)(3)(B) (emphasis added).
450. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 169 (1991).
451. See Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15 (2008)
(amending 35 U.S.C. § 6 to provide that the Secretary of Commerce, in
consultation with the Director of the PTO shall appoint administrative patent
judges).
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Secretary of Commerce.452 In fact, the power to appoint PTAB
judges must rest with the Secretary of Commerce for their
authority to be constitutionally legitimate under the
Appointments Clause.453 Starting in 2000, the Director did have
authority to appoint judges to the Board454 in an effort to enhance
his oversight of agency affairs and to give the agency more
autonomy and operational freedom.455 However, it became clear
by 2008 that this authorization was impermissible.456
Accordingly, Congress revised the statute to its current form,
authorizing “the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the
Director,” to appoint Board judges457 and fix the constitutional
defect.458 Thus, the problem of subdelegating the Director’s
screening function to the PTAB may be intractable. The Director
452. See 35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012) (“The administrative patent judges shall
be . . . appointed by the Secretary”).
453. See generally John F. Duffy, Are Administrative Patent Judges
Unconstitutional?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904 (2009).
454. See Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4717, 113
Stat. 1501 (1999) (“The administrative patent judges shall be . . . appointed by
the Director.”).
455. See 154 CONG. REC. H7234 (2008) (statement of Rep. Steve King)
(“[I]nventors, trademark owners, and Members of Congress believed the agency
would function more efficiently if it were allowed greater operational freedom.”).
456. See id. at H7233–35 (statements of Reps. Steve Cohen and Steve King)
(claiming that the authority to appoint administrative law judges should be
given to the Secretary of Commerce to be consistent with the Constitution).
457. See Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(a), 122 Stat. 3014, 3014–15 (2008)
(delegating the authority to appoint administrative patent judges and
administrative trademark judges to the Secretary of Commerce).
458. The revision certainly solved the matter prospectively: future cases
decided by the Board would not be vulnerable to challenges based on their
issuance by improperly appointed judges. See Duffy, supra note 453, at 919
(discussing how the 2008 appointment structure of administrative patent judges
has solved the constitutional problem of the previous appointment structure).
However, the statute also purported to make the change retroactive in two
ways. One was to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to deem the
appointment of a Director-appointed judge to “take effect on the date” of the
initial appointment. Pub. L. No. 110-313, § 1(c), 122 Stat 3014 (2008). The other
was to establish the “de facto officer” doctrine as a defense to any challenge
against a Director-appointed judge. Id. § 1(d). Neither of these is necessarily a
“constitutionally rigorous solution” to the problem of retroactivity. Duffy, supra
note 453, at 920. Interest in the subject appears to have died down since the
Supreme Court denied certiorari in the leading active challenge to the Patent
Office’s prior practice. See generally Translogic Tech., Inc. v. Dudas, 555 U.S.
813 (2008).
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cannot define the powers of PTAB judges unless he appoints
them, and he cannot constitutionally appoint them.459
This is not to say, of course, that the Director cannot assign
to anyone else the screening of petitions for post-issuance review
under the AIA. The sheer volume of petitions runs into over a
thousand per year,460 and it would be infeasible and absurd to
forbid sub-delegation altogether. The question is, among those
whom the Director can properly appoint, who can properly carry
out the screening function in the Director’s place?
One sensible solution is to differentiate those who can screen
from those who can adjudicate based on the Appointments Clause
jurisprudence itself.461 What makes it necessary for the Secretary
of Commerce to appoint PTAB judges is that they are “inferior
Officers—who perform significant functions pursuant to law and
who are subject to the Appointments Clause” rather than “mere
employees, who are lesser functionaries lacking substantial
powers.”462 The offices of PTAB judges are “established by Law
and they perform more than ministerial tasks”—tasks in which
they exercise “significant discretion.”463
By contrast, the category of employees who would screen
petitions need not exercise the same high level of discretion as
PTAB judges. Their offices are not “established by law” nor their
duties “delineated in a statute.”464 Instead, they could be
constituted merely by internal agency action in the way that
§ 3(b)(3) envisions for the Director.465 They would not “take
459. See supra note 457 and accompanying text (showing that the power to
appoint PTAB judges is delegated to the Secretary of Commerce).
460. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND
APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 (2017), https://perma.cc/7TRU-ZPMM (PDF).
461. See Duffy, supra note 453, at 906 (claiming that “administrative patent
judges exercise significant authority within the meaning of the Supreme Court’s
Appointments Clause jurisprudence.”).
462. See id. (discussing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) and the
distinction between inferior Officers who are subject to the Appointments
Clause and employees).
463. Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881–82 (1991)) (internal
quotations omitted).
464. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 881 (1991).
465. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3) (2012) (stating that the Director has authority
over officer, employees, and agents of the Office “necessary to carry out the
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testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence,
and have the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders,”
as PTAB judges can do—indeed, must do.466
Instead, screening petitions for further review, though not
trivial, would be well within the competency of an agency
employee who has ordinary, examiner-level technical expertise
and ordinary, attorney-level legal training.467 Notably, the
authority of the Director to appoint employees and define their
duties, including by sub-delegation, expressly includes employees
who are attorneys.468 Thus, although the commingling in the
PTAB of the screening and adjudicating functions is unlawful, it
is readily remediable under existing agency authority.
In addition to being improper as a formal matter,
commingling these functions is also improper for functional
reasons. Empowering the PTAB, especially the same three-judge
panel of PTAB judges, to screen petitions and then to adjudicate
them obscures whether, and to what extent, judicial review is
available for the PTAB’s actions. The outcome of the screening
process is “final and nonappealable,” as has been the case in
every mechanism for administrative validity review that
Congress has ever established.469 By contrast, the subsequent
adjudication both is subject to judicial review by statute470 and
would be subject to judicial oversight under the Administrative

functions of the Office”).
466. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 881–82.
467. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, OFFICE OF
ENROLLMENT AND DISCIPLINE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION
TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES BEFORE THE
UNITED
STATES
PATENT
AND
TRADEMARK
OFFICE
2
(2019)
https://perma.cc/RH8F-QEXA (PDF) (stating that the requirements for
registration include “legal, scientific, and technical qualifications
necessary . . . to render applicants valuable service”).
468. See 35 U.S.C. § 3(b)(3)(A) (“The Director shall appoint such officers,
employees (including attorneys), and agents of the Office as the Director
considers necessary . . . .”) (emphasis added).
469. See supra notes 414–416 and accompanying text (explaining how the
Director’s screening decision in administrative validity review is
nonappealable).
470. See 35 U.S.C. § 329 (stating that dissatisfied parties may appeal
decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
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Procedure Act even in the absence of a statute expressly
authorizing review.471 The presumption is in favor of review.472
In fact, the scope of nonappealability is even broader for
screening in AIA proceedings. Decisions to deny petitions are
immune from judicial oversight, and so are decisions to accept
petitions.473 In reexamination, only decisions to deny were
immune,474 leaving decisions to proceed subject to ordinary
judicial review.475
As a result, commingling the screening and adjudicating
functions is a greater concern in the context of inter partes
review, covered business method review, and post-grant review
than it was for the reexamination mechanisms. Faulty decisions
to accept petitions cannot be corrected at all by the courts.476
Classifying issues as screening-related or adjudication-related is
necessary for determining the availability of judicial review.477
There is an incentive, therefore, for the Patent Office to conflate
screening with merits adjudication both to enlarge the domain of
its influence and action and to insulate itself from judicial review.

471. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency
action . . . is entitled to judicial review thereof.”).
472. See Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2140 (2016)
(recognizing the presumption in favor of judicial review in interpreting
statutes).
473. See 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) (immunizing the “determination by the Director
whether to institute” regarding inter partes review) (emphasis added); see also 35
U.S.C. § 324(e) (immunizing the “determination by the Director whether to
institute” regarding post-grant review) (emphasis added).
474. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (1980) (immunizing the “determination by the
Director . . . that no substantial new question of patentability has been raised”)
(emphasis added); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2000) (same); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2002)
(same); 35 U.S.C. § 303(c) (2012) (same); 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (1999) (same); 35
U.S.C. § 312(c) (2002) (same); 35 U.S.C. § 312(c) (2011) (same).
475. See, e.g., In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (finding
appellate jurisdiction to opine on the contours of the “substantial new question
of patentability” requirement).
476. See supra note 473 and accompanying text (stating that determinations
by the Director not to institute review are not subject to appeal).
477. Compare 35 U.S.C. § § 319, 329 (2012) (stating that a party may appeal
the final decision of the PTAB in inter partes review and post-grant
proceedings), with supra note 474 (explaining that the decision to institute
review by the Director is nonappealable).
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D. Focal Points for Reform

As Parts II and III showed, panel stacking and the push for
increasingly unreviewable discretion are symptoms of the recent
tendency of the Patent Office toward aggrandizing its own power.
As Part IV thus far has explained, the etiology has been the
agency’s commingling of separately delegated powers—one
reviewable, the other nonreviewable—against a backdrop of
greater political input into the patent system. From this, there
emerges three simple focal points for reform.
First, the Federal Circuit should take an appropriate
opportunity to interrogate the practice of panel stacking. The
court’s scrutiny should include briefing on the due process issues
that were left unresolved in Alappat and have remained open
ever since.478 For its part, the Patent Office has continued to rely
on the outcome of that case as the basis for its use of panel
stacking,479 and even this justification has been overborne by
intervening changes in the structure of administrative patent
review. 480
It should also include briefing on the ability of the Director of
the Patent Office to take his screening power to determine
whether PTAB petitions are likely enough to prevail that review
is warranted481 and subdelegate that power to administrative
patent judges, whom he is not constitutionally empowered to
appoint or whose duties he is not statutorily empowered to
define.482
Second, the Federal Circuit should continue to view with
skepticism the expansive interpretation of important, but
relatively narrow provisions for nonappealability in PTAB
478. See supra notes 255–261 and accompanying text (comparing the facts of
In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) to the current structure of the
PTAB).
479. See supra note 42 and accompanying text (showing that the Patent
Office still believes Alappat holds and relies on that case in oral argument
before the Federal Circuit)).
480. See supra notes 262–270 and accompanying text (highlighting the need
to maintain the decisional independence of the PTAB judges).
481. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 324 (stating the authority of the Director to
authorize inter partes review and post-grant review).
482. See supra notes 446–458 and accompanying text (explaining that the
Director is no longer empowered to appoint administrative patent judges).
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review. Despite an early victory before the Federal Circuit in St.
Jude and Achates483 and before the Supreme Court in Cuozzo,484
the Patent Office seems to have reached a retrenchment in its
autonomy from judicial supervision. The en banc Federal Circuit
in Wi-Fi One485 and the Supreme Court in SAS Institute486
rejected the most recent and most far-reaching claims of
unreviewable agency discretion. It is the application of these
latter precedents as refinements of the initial cases that hold the
greatest promise for vindicating the robust presumption in favor
of judicial review over agency action, and for preserving the
ability of the Federal Circuit to police not only current Patent
Office excesses, but future excesses as well.487
Third, the Federal Circuit, in a case that properly presents
the issue, should revisit the current Patent Office structure that
commingles the Director’s screening powers with the PTAB’s
adjudication powers. These powers are separately delegated in
the organic statute that establishes administrative patent
revocation, and the differences between them are significant.488
One entrusts discretion to a political agency head in order to
enable initial judgments about allocating scarce agency resources
without immediate judicial intrusion. The other requires
adjudication that is both based on neutral, generally applicable
legal principles and legitimized by meaningful judicial review. To
commingle these powers in the same entity within the Patent
Office obscures their distinct purposes and enables the very
pattern of aggrandizement that the agency has undertaken. The
Federal Circuit in Ethicon declined an opportunity to address the
merits of these issues both in its panel decision and in its denial
483. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the impact of the nonappealability of
PTAB decisions).
484. See supra Part II.B (explaining the potential limits of the unreviewable
discretion of the Patent Office).
485. See supra Part II.C (illustrating statutory limits on the Patent Office to
reevaluate patent validity).
486. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Patent Office’s conflation of the
power to screen petitions with the power to adjudicate).
487. See supra Part III.B.4 (reasoning that the inability to review PTAB
decisions leads to a lack of judicial scrutiny by the Federal Circuit).
488. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(b), 321(b) (2012) (granting the Patent Office the
authority to “cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a patent”).
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of en banc rehearing,489 though Judge Newman’s dissents in both
instances offer a valuable roadmap for redoubling the effort to
seek en banc review in the future.490
V. Conclusion
Much of the Patent Office’s recent political aggrandizement
is a result of conflating large portions of its ordinarily reviewable
adjudicatory process with the initial unreviewable screening
process that it also happens to administer.491 The sustained
campaign of the agency to conduct patent validity reviews outside
the reach of judicial review is at the heart of the leading systemic
controversies in patent law today. The conflation of the agency’s
power to screen petitions with its power to adjudicate them has
also brought with it a new opacity in how the agency reaches its
decisions. Of particular concern are the stacking of adjudicatory
panels until a majority emerges that can deliver politically
palatable judgments492 and the push to expand ordinary
nonappealability provisions to cover a wide range of adjudicatory
activities over which the Federal Circuit would routinely exercise
review.493
Only six years have passed since the AIA’s post-grant trial
proceedings went into effect. The relatively early stage at which
these decisions have come, therefore, make this an important
moment in the evolution of patent law’s power. Ignoring these
problematic agency practices and allowing their underlying cause
to persist would reinforce an already troubling status quo.
489. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1033
(“There is nothing in the Constitution or the statute that precludes the same
Board panel from making the decision to institute and then rendering the final
decision.”); see also Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP, 826 F.3d 1366
(denying the en banc rehearing on the issue of the commingling screening power
and adjudication).
490. See Ethicon, 812 F.3d at 1036 (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that
assigning the same PTAB panel to both institute and conduct inter partes
review is contrary to the statute, 35 U.S.C. §§ 314, 316 (2012)); Ethicon, 826
F.3d at 1368 (Newman, J., dissenting) (same).
491. See supra Part II.D.
492. See supra Part II.A.
493. See supra Part III.B.4.
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Rejecting these practices and correcting the source of their
proliferation would do much to bring into focus the neglected, but
powerful influence of political decision-making on the modern
exercise of agency power over patent validity.
VI. Appendix: Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Patent Trials, 1945–2011

